

SANATSUGÂTÎYA.

INTRODUCTION

TO

SANATSUGÂTÎYA.

THE Sanatsugâtiya is, like the Bhagavadgîtâ, one of the numerous episodes of the Mahâbhârata¹. It is true, that it has never commanded anything like that unbounded veneration which has always been paid in India to the Bhagavadgîtâ. Still it is sometimes studied even in our days, and it has had the high distinction of being commented on by the great leader of the modern Vedântic school—Saṅkarâkârya². The Sanatsugâtiya purports to be a dialogue mainly between Sanatsugâta on the one side and Dhṛitarâshṭra on the other. Sanatsugâta, from whom it takes its name, is said to be identical with Sanatku-mâra, a name not unfamiliar to students of our Upanishad literature. And Dhṛitarâshṭra is the old father of those Kauravas who formed one of the belligerent parties in the bellum plusquam civile which is recorded in the Mahâbhârata. The connexion of this particular episode with the main current of the narrative of that epos is one of the loosest possible character—much looser, for instance, than that of the Bhagavadgîtâ. As regards the latter, it can fairly be contended that it is in accordance with poetical justice for Arguna to feel despondent and unwilling to engage in battle, after actual sight of ‘teachers, fathers, sons,’ and all the rest of them, arrayed in opposition to him; and that therefore it was necessary for the poet to adduce some specific explanation as to how Arguna was ultimately enabled to get over such natural scruples. But as regards the Sanatsugâtiya, even such a contention as this

¹ Mahâbhârata, Udyoga Parvan, Adhyâya 41–46.

² Mâdhavâkârya, in speaking of Saṅkara’s works, describes him as having commented on the Sanatsugâtiya, which is ‘far from evil (persons)’ [asatsudû-ram]. Saṅkara-vigaya, chapter VI, stanza 62.

can have no place. For this is *how the matter stands*. In the course of the negotiations for an amicable arrangement¹ between the Pândavas and the Kauravas, Sañgaya, on one occasion, came back to Dhr̥itarâsh̥tra with a message from the Pândavas. When he saw Dhr̥itarâsh̥tra, however, he said that he would deliver the message in the public assembly of the Kauravas the next morning, and went away after pronouncing a severe censure on Dhr̥itarâsh̥tra for his conduct. The suspense thus caused was a source of much vexation to the old man, and so he sent for Vidura, in order, as he expresses it, that Vidura might by his discourse assuage the fire that was raging within him. Vidura accordingly appears, and enters upon an elaborate prelection concerning matters spiritual, or, perhaps, more accurately quasi-spiritual, and at the outset of the Sanatsugâtiya he is supposed to have reached a stage where, as being born a Sûdra, he hesitates to proceed. After some discussion of this point, between Vidura and Dhr̥itarâsh̥tra, it is determined to call in the aid of Sanatsugâta, to explain the spiritual topics which Vidura felt a delicacy in dealing with; and Sanatsugâta is accordingly introduced on the scene in a way not unusual in our epic and purânic literature, viz. by Vidura engaging in some mystic process of meditation, in response to which Sanatsugâta appears. He is received then with all due formalities, and after he has had some rest, as our poem takes care to note, he is catechised by Dhr̥itarâsh̥tra; and with one or two exceptions, all the verses which constitute the Sanatsugâtiya are Sanatsugâta's answers to Dhr̥itarâsh̥tra's questions².

This brief statement of the scheme of this part of the Mahâbhârata shows, as already pointed out, that the connexion of the Sanatsugâtiya with the central story of that epic is very loose indeed; and that it might have been entirely omitted without occasioning any æsthetical or other defect. And therefore, although there is nothing positive

¹ See p. 3 supra.

² After this dialogue is over, the dawn breaks, and Dhr̥itarâsh̥tra and the Kaurava princes meet in general assembly.

tending to prove the Sanatsugâtîya to be a later addition to the original epos, still the misgivings which are often entertained upon such points may well, in this case, be stronger than in the case of the Bhagavadgîtâ. The text, too, of the Sanatsugâtîya is not preserved in nearly so satisfactory a condition as that of the Gîtâ. I have had before me, in settling my text, the editions of the Mahâbhârata respectively printed and published at Bombay¹, Calcutta, and Madras, and three MSS., one of which was most kindly and readily placed at my disposal by my friend Professor Râmkrishna Gopâl Bhândârkar; the second by another friend, Professor Âbâgî Vishnu Kâthavate; and the third was a copy made for me at Sâgar in the Central Provinces, through the good offices of a third friend, Mr. Vâman Mahâdeva Kolhatkar. The copy lent me by Professor Bhândârkar comes from Puna, and that lent by Professor Kâthavate also from Puna. This last, as well as the Sâgar copy, and the edition printed at Madras, contains the commentary of Saṅkarâkârya. And the text I have adopted is that which is indicated by the commentary as the text which its author had before him. But the several copies of the commentary differ so much from one another, that it is still a matter of some doubt with me, whether I have got accurately the text which Saṅkara commented upon. For instance, the Sâgar copy entirely omits chapter V, while the other copies not only give the text of that chapter, but also a commentary upon it which calls itself Saṅkarâkârya's commentary². Again, take the stanzas which stand within brackets at pp. 167, 168³ of our translation. There is in none of the copies we have, any commentary of Saṅkarâkârya on them. And yet the stanzas exist in the text of the Mahâbhârata as given in those copies which do contain Saṅkara's commentary. The matter is evidently one for further investigation. I have not, however, thought it

¹ This contains Nîlakantha's commentary, but his text avowedly includes the text of Saṅkara, and verses and readings contained in more modern copies.

² The commentary on the sixth chapter, however, takes up the thread from the end of the fourth chapter.

³ See p. 182, where one of the lines recurs.

absolutely necessary to make such an investigation for the purposes of the present translation. But to be on the safe side, I have retained in the translation everything which is to be found in those copies of the Sanatsugâtiya which also contain Saṅkara's commentary. As to other stanzas—and there are some of this description—which other MSS. or commentators vouch for, but of which no trace is to be found in the MSS. containing Saṅkara's commentary¹, I have simply omitted them.

These facts show that, in the case of the Sānatsugâtiya, the materials for a trustworthy historical account of the work are not of a very satisfactory character. The materials for ascertaining its date and position in Sanskrit literature are, indeed, so scanty, that poor as we have seen the materials for the Bhagavadgītā to be, they must be called superlatively rich as compared with those we have now to deal with. As regards external evidence on the points now alluded to, the first and almost the last fact falling under that head, is the fact of the work being quoted from and commented upon by Saṅkarâkârya. In his commentary on the Svetâsvatara-upanishad², Saṅkara cites the passage about the flamingo at p. 189, introducing it with the words, 'And in the Sanatsugâta also.' In the same³ commentary some other passages from the Sanatsugâtiya are also quoted, but without naming the work except as a Smṛiti, and mixing up together verses from different parts of the work.

This is really all the external evidence, that I am aware of, touching the date of the Sanatsugâtiya. There is, however, one other point, which it is desirable to notice, though not, perhaps, so much because it is of any very great value in itself, as because it may hereafter become useful, should further research into the Mahābhārata and other works yield the requisite information. There are, then, eight stanzas in the thirty-sixth, thirty-seventh, thirty-ninth, and fortieth chapters of the Udyoga Parvan of the Mahābhā-

¹ See note 1, p. 137.

² P. 283.

³ P. 252. See, too, Sāṅkara Bhāṣhya, p. 828.

rata (the Sanatsugâtîya commencing at the forty-first chapter), seven of which are quoted in the *Pañkatantra*¹, and the eighth in the *Mahâbhâshya*² of Patañjali. Of course, it almost goes without saying, that neither the *Pañkatantra* nor the *Mahâbhâshya* mentions the source from which they derive the verses in question. But I do not think it unallowable to make the provisional assumption, that they were derived from the *Mahâbhârata*, so long as we cannot produce any other, and more likely, source. It is true, that Professor Weber has, in another connexion, impugned the cogency of this argument. He seems to think, that the probability—in the case he was actually dealing with—of the *Râmâyana* having borrowed from the *Mahâbhâshya*, is quite as strong as the probability of the *Mahâbhâshya* having borrowed from the *Râmâyana*³. And doubtless, he would by parity of reason contend, in the case before us, that the probabilities, as between the *Mahâbhârata* on the one hand, and the *Mahâbhâshya* and the *Pañkatantra* on the other, bear the same mutual relation. I cannot accept this view. I am not now concerned to discuss the merits of the conclusion in support of which Professor Weber has advanced this argument⁴. I am only considering, how far it affects the question now before us. And as to that question, I may say, that the *Pañkatantra* expressly introduces the stanzas now under consideration with some such expression as, 'For it has been said,' indicating clearly that it was there quoting the words of another⁵. And so, too, does the *Mahâbhâshya*,

¹ Cf. Kosegarten's *Pañkatantra*, p. 28 (I, 28, Bombay S. C. ed.), with *Udyoga Parvan*, chap. XL, st. 7 (Bombay ed.); *Pañkatantra*, pp. 112 and 209 (II, 10; IV, 5, Bombay ed.), with *Udyoga Parvan*, chap. XXXVIII, 9; p. 35 (I, 37, Bombay ed.) with chap. XXXVI, st. 34; p. 140 (II, 40, Bombay ed.) with chap. XXXVII, st. 15; p. 160 (III, 62, Bombay ed.) with chap. XXXVII, st. 17, 18; p. 106 (II, 2, Bombay ed.) with chap. XXXVI, st. 59.

² *Udyoga Parvan*, chap. XXXVIII, st. 1, and *Mahâbhâshya* VI, 1-4, p. 35 (Banâras ed.)

³ See *Indian Antiquary* IV, 247. The parallel from Mâdhava which Professor Weber adduces is quite inconclusive, and as far as it goes appears to me to militate against the Professor's own view.

⁴ I may, however, admit at once, that I ought not to have expressed myself as strongly as I did in the note which Professor Weber criticises.

⁵ See p. 203 *infra*.

where the passage we refer to runs as follows : ‘ (It is) laid down, (that there is) a sin in one of tender age not rising to receive (an elderly person), and (that there is) merit in rising to receive. How ? Thus, “ The life-winds of a youth depart upwards, when an elderly man approaches (him). By rising to receive (him), and salutation, he obtains them again.” ’ It appears to me, that the indications of this being a quotation in the Bhâshya are very strong. But apart from that, I do demur to the proposition, that the probabilities are equal, of a work like the Mahâbhârata or Râmâyana borrowing a verse from the Mahâbhâshya, and vice versa. It appears to me perfectly plain, I own, that the probability of a grammatical work like the Bhâshya borrowing a verse from a standard work like the Bhârata or Râmâyana for purposes of illustration is very much the stronger of the two. And this, quite independently of any inquiry as to whether the Bhâshya does or does not show other indications of acquaintance with the Bhârata or the Râmâyana.

If these arguments are correct, it seems to me that they carry us thus far in our present investigation—namely, that we may now say, that we have reason to believe some parts, at all events, of the thirty-sixth, thirty-seventh, thirty-eighth, and fortieth chapters of the Udyoga Parvan of the Mahâbhârata to have probably been in existence prior to the sixth century A.C.¹; and that some parts of the thirty-seventh chapter were probably extant in the time of Patañjali, viz. the second century B.C.² Now, internal evidence does not yield any indications tending to show that the several chapters here referred to must have been prior in time to the chapters composing the Sanatsugâtîya, which come so soon after them in the Mahâbhârata. On the contrary, it is not too much to maintain, that to a certain extent the style and language of the Sanatsugâtîya is, if anything, rather indicative of its priority in time over the five chapters immediately preceding it. And, therefore, so far as this argument goes, it enables us—provisionally only, it must be

¹ See p. 29 supra.

² See p. 32 supra.

remembered—to fix the second century B.C. as a terminus ad quem for the date of the Sanatsugâtîya.

This is all the external evidence available for a discussion of the question—when the Sanatsugâtîya was composed. We now turn to the internal evidence. Standing by itself, internal evidence is not, in my opinion, of much cogency in any case. Still in ascertaining, as best we can, the history of our ancient literature, even this species of evidence is not to be despised; it must only be used and received with caution. Under this head, then, we may note first the persons who are supposed to take part in the dialogue. Sanatsugâta¹—or Sanatkumâra—as already pointed out, is a name already familiar to the readers of one of our older Upanishads—the *Khândogya*. Dhṛitarâshṭra is not known in the Upanishads, but he is an important personage in the epic literature. And it is to be remarked, that his character as disclosed in the Sanatsugâtîya is not at all similar to that which has attached itself to his name, alike in the later literature of our country, and in that popular opinion which was probably formed by this later literature. In the dialogue before us, he figures as an earnest inquirer after truth; he is described as the ‘talented king Dhṛitarâshṭra;’ and is addressed by Sanatsugâta as, ‘O acute sir!’ ‘O learned person!’ True it is, that Nīlakantha in one place, as we have noticed in our note there², endeavours to bring out the later view of Dhṛitarâshṭra’s character³; but it seems to me that that endeavour, based as it is on a forced and far-fetched interpretation of a single word in our poem, is an unsuccessful one. None of the questions, which Dhṛitarâshṭra puts to Sanatsugâta in the course of their dialogue, indicates the avaricious old man who wished to deprive his innocent nephews of their just rights in the interests of his own wicked and misguided sons. They rather indicate the bona fide student of spiritual lore, and thus point to what is, perhaps, an earlier view of Dhṛitarâshṭra’s character.

¹ See Hall’s *Sāṅkhyasāra*, preface, pp. 14, 15.

² P. 151, note 2.

³ Nīlakantha himself, however, treats Dhṛitarâshṭra’s question later on as showing that he had attained indifference to worldly concerns. That question does not occur in Saṅkara’s text, but is given at p. 158 *infra*.

If we look next to the general style of this poem, we find that it has none of that elaboration which marks what I have called the age of Kāvya and Nāṭakas. The remarks on this topic in the Introduction to the Gîtā apply pretty accurately to this work also. We observe here the same paucity of long-drawn compounds, the same absence of merely ornamental adjectives, the same absence of figures and tropes¹; in one word, the same directness and simplicity of style. Furthermore, there is a somewhat greater want of finish about the syntax of our poem than there is even in the Gîtā. Such constructions as we find *inter alia* at chapter II, stanza 2, or 25, or at chapter III, stanza 14, or chapter IV, stanza 12, or in the early verses of the last chapter, indicate a period in the history of the language, when probably the regulations of syntax were not quite thoroughly established in practice.

If we turn to the metre of the poem, an analogous phenomenon strikes us there. Similar irregularities in the collocation of long and short syllables, similar superfluities and deficiencies of syllables, meet us in the Sanatsugâtīya and the Bhagavadgîtā. And in the former work, as in the latter, the irregularities are less observable in the Anuṣṭubh² than in the other metres used. Probably the explanation, apart from the great elasticity of that metre, is that the Anuṣṭubh had been more used, and had in consequence become comparatively more settled in its scheme even in practical composition.

Looking now more particularly to the language of the work before us, we find one word to be of most frequent occurrence, namely, the word *vai*, which we have rendered 'verily.' It is not a common word in the later literature, while in the Upanishad literature we meet with great frequency, not merely *vai*, but the words, which I think are cognate with it, *vâ* and *vâva*. The former word, indeed,

¹ The five similes which occur, and which are nearly all that occur, in the poem, are the very primitive ones—of the hunter, of water on grass, the tiger of straw, death eating men like a tiger, dogs eating what is vomited, a branch of a tree and the moon, and birds and their nests.

² Cf. as to this the *Nṛsiṃha Tâpinī*, p. 105.

appears to me to stand in some passages of the Upanishads for *vai* by euphonic alterations. Thus in the passage *tvam vâ aham asmi bhagavo devate, aham vai tvam asi*, it is difficult not to suppose that the *vâ* of the first part of the sentence is the same word as the *vai* of the second part, only altered according to the rules of Sandhi in Sanskrit.

A second point of similarity between the language of the Upanishads and that of the Sanatsugâtîya is to be found in the phrase, 'He who knows this becomes immortal.' This sentence, or one of like signification, is, as is well known, of common occurrence in the Upanishads and in the Brâhmanas. In the Bhagavadgîtâ, the verses towards the end, which come after *Kṛishna's* summing-up of his instruction, seem to be of a somewhat analogous, though in some respects different, nature. And in the Purânas we meet sometimes with elaborate passages extolling the merits of a particular rite, or a particular pilgrimage, and so forth. This form of the Phalasruti, as it is called, appears to have been developed in process of time from the minute germ existing in the Brâhmanas and the Upanishads. In the Sanatsugâtîya, however, we are almost at the beginning of those developments; indeed, the form before us is identically the same as that which we see in the works where it is first met with. It is a short sentence, which, though complete in itself, still appears merely at the end of another passage, and almost as a part of such other passage.

There is one other point of a kindred nature which it may be well to notice here. As in the Gîtâ, so in the Sanatsugâtîya, we meet with a considerable number of words used in senses not familiar in the later literature. They are collected in the Index of Sanskrit words in this volume; but a few remarks on some of them will not, it is thought, be entirely out of place here. The word *mârga*¹—in the sense of 'worldly life'—is rather remarkable. Saṅkara renders it by 'the path of *samsâra*' or worldly life. And he quotes as a parallel the passage from the *Kāṇḍogya-*

¹ I give no references here, as they can be found in the Index of Sanskrit words at the end of this volume.

upanishad which speaks of returning to the 'path.' There, however, Saṅkara explains it to mean the 'path by which the self returns to worldly life,' namely, from space to the wind and so forth into vegetables, and food, ultimately appearing as a foetus. Another remarkable word is 'varga,' which occurs twice in the Sanatsugāṭīya. Saṅkara and Nīlakantha differ in their explanations of it, and Nīlakantha indeed gives two different meanings to the word in the two passages where it occurs. We may also refer here specially to *utsa*, *ṛitvig*, and *matvā*. In Boehtlingk and Roth's Lexicon the only passages cited under 'utsa' are from Vedic works, except two respectively from Susruta and the Dasakumāra-karita. One passage, however, there cited, viz. *Vishṇoḥ pade parame madhva utsaḥ*, is plainly the original of the passage we are now considering. As to *ṛitvig* in the sense it bears here, we see, I think, what was the earlier signification of that word before it settled down into the somewhat technical meaning in which it is now familiar. And *matvā* in the sense of 'meditating upon' is to be found in the Upanishads, but not, I think, in any work of the classical literature. These words, therefore, seem to indicate that the Sanatsugāṭīya was composed at a stage in the development of the Sanskrit language which is a good deal earlier than the stage which we see completely reached in the classical literature.

Coming now to the matter of the Sanatsugāṭīya, it appears to me, that we there see indications pointing in a general way to the same conclusion as that which we have here arrived at. There is, in the first place, a looseness and want of rigid system in the mode of handling the subject, similar to that which we have already observed upon as characterising the Bhagavadgītā. There is no obvious bond of connexion joining together the various subjects discussed, nor are those subjects themselves treated after any very scientific or rigorous method. Again, if the fourth chapter is a genuine part of the Sanatsugāṭīya, we have an elaborate repetition in one part, of what has been said in another part of the work, with only a few variations in words, and

perhaps fewer still in signification. As, however, I am not at present prepared to stand finally by the genuineness of that chapter, I do not consider it desirable to further labour this argument than to point out, that similar repetitions, on a smaller scale, perhaps, are not uncommon in our older literature¹.

Coming now to the manner in which the Vedas are spoken of in the work before us, there are, we find, one or two noteworthy circumstances proper to be considered here. In the first place, we have the reference to the four Vedas together with *Âkhyânas* as the fifth Veda. This is in conformity with the old tradition recorded in the various works to which we have referred in our note on the passage. The mention of the *Atharva-veda*, which is implied in this passage, and expressly contained in another, might be regarded as some mark of a modern age. But without dwelling upon the fact, that the *Atharva-veda*, though probably modern as compared with the other Vedas, is still old enough to date some centuries before the Christian era², it must suffice to draw attention here to the fact that the *Khândogya-upanishad* mentions that Veda, and it is not here argued that the *Sanatsugâtîya* is older than the *Khândogya-upanishad*. We have next to consider the reference to the *Sâman* hymns as 'vimala,' or pure. The point involved in this reference has been already sufficiently discussed in the Introduction to the *Gîtâ*³; and it is not necessary here to say more than that, of the two classes of works we have there made, the *Sanatsugâtîya* appears from the passage under discussion to rank itself with the class which is prior in date.

The estimate of the value of the Vedas which is implied in the *Sanatsugâtîya* appears to coincide very nearly with that which we have shown to be the estimate implied in the *Bhagavadgîtâ*. The Vedas are not here cast aside as useless any more than they are in the *Bhagavadgîtâ*. For, I do not think the word *Anrikas* which occurs in one passage of the work can be regarded really as referring to those

See p. 181, note 1 infra.

² P. 19 supra.

Pp. 19, 20.

who entirely reject the Vedic revelation. But without going as far as that, the Sanatsugâtîya seems certainly to join the Bhagavadgîtâ in its protest against those men of extreme views, who could see nothing beyond the rites and ceremonies taught in the Vedas. A study of the Vedas is, indeed, insisted on in sundry passages of the Sanatsugâtîya. But it is equally maintained, that the performance of the ceremonies laid down in the Vedas is not the true means of final emancipation. It is maintained, that action done with any desire is a cause of bondage to worldly life; that the gods themselves are ordinary creatures who have reached a certain high position owing to the practice of the duties of Brahmakârins, but that they are not only not superior to, but are really under the control of, the man who has acquired the true knowledge of the universal self. On all these points, we have opinions expressed in the Sanatsugâtîya, which conclusively establish an identity of doctrine as between the Upanishads and the Bhagavadgîtâ¹ on the one hand, and the Sanatsugâtîya on the other. Lastly, we have an explicit statement, that the mere study of Vedic texts avails nothing, and that sin is not to be got rid of by one who merely 'studies the *Rik* and the *Yagus* texts, and the *Sâma-veda*.' It is not necessary to repeat here the chronological deductions which may be based upon this relation between the Sanatsugâtîya and the Vedas. We have already argued in the Introduction to the Bhagavadgîtâ, that such a relation points to a period of Indian religious history prior to the great movement of Gautama Buddha².

There is, however, this difference, perhaps, to be noted between the Gîtâ and the Sanatsugâtîya—namely, that the latter work seems to afford more certain indications of the recognition, at the date of its composition, of a *Gñânakânda* as distinguished from a *Karmakânda* in the Vedas, than, we have seen, are contained in the Bhagavadgîtâ³. The passage, for instance, which speaks of the *Khandas* as

¹ Cf. p. 16 supra.

² Cf. pp. 25, 26.

³ P. 17.

referring 'of themselves' to the Brahman, and the passage which refers to an understanding of the Brahman by means of the Vedas, according to the principle of the moon and the branch—these seem rather to point to a portion of the Vedas which was regarded as giving instruction in true knowledge, as distinguished from merely laying down various sacrifices and ceremonials for special purposes. In fact, in one passage we have the germ of the whole Vedântic theory as afterwards settled. For there we are told, that sacrifices and penances are laid down as the preliminary steps towards the acquisition of true knowledge. By those sacrifices one is purified of one's sins, and then acquires a knowledge of the supreme self as described in the Vedas—which, I apprehend, must mean the Upanishads.

There is but one other point on which we need say anything further. And that is connected with the definition of a Brâhmaṇa. That definition appears to me, to point to an earlier stage in religious progress than is indicated in Âpastamba and Manu. The true Brâhmaṇa is he who is attached to the Brahman. Perhaps, this marks some little advance beyond the more general doctrine of the Gîtâ, but it is still very far short of the petrified doctrine, if I may so call it, of the later law-givers. The Brâhmaṇa has not yet degenerated into the mere receiver of fees and presents, but is still in possession of the truth.

We thus see, that the external and internal evidence bearing upon the question of the position of the Sanatsugâtîya in Sanskrit literature, seems to point to nearly the same period and place for it as for the Bhagavadgîtâ. It is plain enough, that the evidence under both heads is extremely scanty and meagre. But such as it is, it appears to us to justify a provisional conclusion, that the Sanatsugâtîya dates from a period prior to the rise of Buddhism, and forms part of that same movement in the religious history of ancient India of which the Gîtâ is another embodiment. More than this, we are not at present in a position to assert. To this extent, the evidence enables us, I think, to go. And we accordingly hold, that unless

other and further evidence requires a reversal of this judgment, the Sanatsugâtiya may be treated as a work nearly contemporary with the Bhagavadgîtâ, and occupying generally the same point of view.

One word, finally, about the translation. As stated already, the text adopted is that which appears to have been before Saṅkarâkârya. And the translation follows mainly his interpretations in his commentary. Sometimes we have followed *Nilakantha*, whose commentary has been consulted as well as a very incorrect copy of another commentary by one *Sarvagṇa Nârâyana*, contained in the MS. from *Puna* lent me by Professor *Bhândârkar*. In some places even the commentators have failed to clear up obscurities, and there we have given the best translation we could suggest, indicating the difficulties. There has been an endeavour made here, as in the case of the Bhagavadgîtâ, to keep the translation as close and faithful to the text as the exigencies of the English language permitted. The exegetical notes are mostly taken from the commentaries, even where the name of the commentator is not specified; while the references to parallel passages have been collected, mostly by myself, in the same way as in the case of the Bhagavadgîtâ.

SANATSUGÂTÎYA.

CHAPTER I.

Dhṛitarâshṭra said :

If, O Vidura ! there is anything not (yet) said by you in (your) discourse, then do impart it to me who wish to hear, for you have spoken marvellous (things).

Vidura said :

O Dhṛitarâshṭra ! the ancient youth Sanatsugâta, (otherwise called) Sanâtana¹, who declared that death exists not—he, O descendant of Bharata ! the best of all talented men, will explain all the doubts of your mind, both those (which are) secret², and those openly declared.

Dhṛitarâshṭra said :

What, do you not yourself know more about this (subject), that Sanâtana should explain (it) to me ? Explain (it) yourself, O Vidura ! if there is any remnant of intelligence (left) in you.

¹ So Nîlakanṭha. Saṅkara says Sanatsugâta is Sanatkumâra, and the component parts of the name he paraphrases by 'born from Brahman.' For Sanâtana, see *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 506, and note 1, p. 141 supra.

² I.e. relating to subjects which may be freely discussed by all, and those which may not. Nîlakanṭha adopts a different reading, which he interprets to mean 'doctrines exoteric and esoteric,' e.g. self-restraint, &c., and the acquisition of mystic power, &c., respectively. The expression 'doubts of the mind' occurs, however, further on.

Vidura said :

I am born of a Sûdra womb, and do not like to say more than what (I have said). But the intelligence of that youth, I believe to be eternal¹. He who has come of a Brâhmaṇa womb, even though he may proclaim a great mystery, does not thereby become liable to the censure of the gods. Therefore do I say this to you.

Dhṛitarâshṭra said :

Do you, O Vidura! speak to the ancient Sanâtana for me, so that there may be a meeting even here, between (myself in) this body (and him).

Vaisampâyana² said :

(Then) Vidura meditated on that sage whose vows are laudable³. And he, too, O descendant of Bharata! knowing of such meditation, made his appearance. And he⁴, too, received him with the ceremonies prescribed in the ordinances. After he had been comfortably seated, and had taken rest, Vidura then spoke to him : ' Venerable sir! there is some doubt in Dhṛitarâshṭra's mind, which cannot

¹ I.e., I suppose, never-failing, and such as can deal with all sorts of topics. Sanatkumâra, it need scarcely be stated, is the teacher of Nârada in the famous dialogue in the *Khândogyaopaniṣad*, p. 473.

² Vaisampâyana is the narrator of the grand story of which pieces like the present form parts.

³ The reading is sometimes different, so as to mean 'of rigid vows,' as at Gîtâ, p. 61 supra.

⁴ The pronouns here are too numerous. Does 'he' here refer to Dhṛitarâshṭra? Vidura seems more likely, though the express mention of him in the next sentence might be treated as pointing the other way.

be explained by me. Do you be pleased to explain (it) to him. Hearing it (explained), this lord of men may cross beyond all misery, so that gain and loss¹, (what is) agreeable and (what is) odious, old age and death, fear and vindictiveness, hunger and thirst, frenzy and worldly greatness, disgust and also laziness, desire and wrath, ruin and prosperity, may not trouble him.'

CHAPTER II.

Vaisampâyana said :

Then the talented king, Dhṛitarâshṭra, bowed² to those words uttered by Vidura, and, in a secluded place³, interrogated Sanatsugâta regarding the highest knowledge⁴, wishing to become (a) high-souled (man)⁵.

Dhṛitarâshṭra said :

O Sanatsugâta ! which of the two is correct, your teaching⁶, about which I have heard, that death exists not, or that⁷ the gods and demons practised

¹ Comp. Gîtâ passim; disgust, scil. that resulting from a general dissatisfaction with everything. As to 'ruin and prosperity,' Nîlakantha adds, 'and their causes, sin and merit.'

² Literally 'respected.' Nîlakantha says it means 'rejoiced over,' for Dhṛitarâshṭra thought, that in spite of his treachery he was safe, as death was taught by Sanatsugâta to have no existence.

³ I.e. free from the presence of ignorant and vulgar people. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 68 supra.

⁴ I.e. knowledge concerning the supreme Self.

⁵ Saṅkara's construction seems different, but is not quite clear. He says, 'wishing to become—Brahman—the meaning is wishing to acquire the self lost through ignorance.'

⁶ I.e. imparted to your pupils, Saṅkara adds; 'heard,' scil. from Vidura.

⁷ The construction is imperfect, but the sense is clear. Is your

the life of Brahma-kârins¹, for freedom from death?

Sanatsugâta said :

‘Some (say), that freedom from death (results) from action²; and others that death exists not. Hear me explain (this), O king! have no misgiving about it³. Both truths, O Kshatriya! have been current from the beginning⁴. The wise maintain what (is called) delusion (to be) death. I⁵ verily call heedlessness death, and likewise I call freedom from heedlessness immortality. Through heedlessness, verily, were the demons⁶ vanquished; and through freedom

view correct, or the view involved in the practice of gods and demons?

¹ See Gîtâ, p. 69 supra; *Ka/hopanishad*, p. 102; *Prasna*, p. 162. As to the gods being afraid of death, see *K/hândogya*, p. 50; and *Nr̥simha Tâpinî*, p. 32; and as to gods and demons practising the life of Brahma-kârins, see *K/hândogya*, p. 571; and cf. *Brihad-âraṇyaka*, p. 964.

² I.e. action prescribed in the Vedas.

³ I.e. as to how I shall be able to reconcile the seeming contradiction between the ‘two truths.’

⁴ I.e. of creation.

⁵ Sanatsugâta says he differs from ‘the wise;’ delusion=thinking the not-self to be the self; heedlessness=falling off from one’s natural condition as the Brahman—which is the cause of delusion (Sāṅkara). See p. 153 infra; *Ka/ha*, p. 152; and *Taittiriya-upanishad*, p. 80.

⁶ Sāṅkara suggests that demons might mean creatures attached to worldly objects; and gods those who are pleased in their own self; and he cites a stanza in support of this suggestion. The allusion, however, seems to be plainly to the story at *K/hândogya*, p. 571 seq., where the idea and expression of ‘being vanquished’ also occurs (p. 583). That word Sāṅkara interprets in connexion with his suggested interpretation to mean ‘are born in lower species.’ See *K/hândogya*, p. 585, and *Maitrî*, p. 211, about asuras or demons. It is interesting to note that in the *Introduction to the Mahâbhâshya*, there is an allusion to a story of the ‘demons’ being ‘vanquished’ in consequence of their grammatical blunders.

from heedlessness the gods attained to the Brahman. Death, verily, does not devour living creatures like a tiger ; for, indeed, his form is not to be perceived. Some ¹ say that death is different from this, (named) Yama, who dwells in the self ²; the (practice of the) life of Brahma $\acute{k}$ ârins (being) immortality. That god governs his kingdom in the world of the Pitris, (being) good to the good, and not good to (those who are) not good. That death, (or) heedlessness, develops in men as desire, and afterwards as wrath, and in the shape of delusion ³. And then travelling in devious paths ⁴ through egoism, one does not attain to union ⁵ with the self. Those who are deluded by it ⁶, and who remain under its influence, depart from this (world), and there again fall down ⁷. Then the deities ⁸ gather around them. And then he undergoes death after death ⁹. Being attached to the fruit of action, on action presenting itself, they follow after it ¹⁰, and do not cross

¹ Those deluded by worldly objects; 'this' means 'heedlessness.'

² Sankara cites a stanza from Manu, which says that king Yama Vaivasvata dwells in the heart of every one. Cf. Aitareya-upanishad, p. 187. The following clause he understands to contain two epithets of Yama, meaning 'immortal, and intent on the Brahman.' I follow Nîlakantha, but not very confidently.

³ Cf. Gîtâ, p. 57. Here we have the developments, the varying forms, of death or heedlessness.

⁴ I.e. paths contrary to *Srutis* and *Smritis*.

⁵ Concentration of mind on the self or Brahman.

⁶ I.e. the egoism spoken of before.

⁷ I.e. to this mortal world. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 84, and *Bṛhadâraṇyaka*, pp. 855, 856. There = from the next world. Sankara says, 'having lived there.'

⁸ I.e. the senses. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 123, and inter alia *Îsopanishad*, p. 10.

⁹ Cf. *Kaṭha*, p. 129, and *Bṛhadâraṇyaka*, p. 889.

¹⁰ I.e. the fruit. Cf. *Kaṭha*, p. 155, and *Mundaka*, p. 317.

beyond death. And the embodied (self), in consequence of not understanding union¹ with the real entity, proceeds on all hands² with attachment to enjoyments. That³, verily, is the great source of delusion to the senses; for by contact⁴ with unreal entities, his migrations⁵ are (rendered) inevitable; because having his inner self contaminated by contact with unreal entities, he devotes himself to objects of sense on all sides, pondering on them (only). (That) pondering, verily, first ruins⁶ him; and soon afterwards desire and wrath, after attacking him. These⁷ lead children to death. But sensible men cross beyond death by their good sense. He who pondering (on the self) destroys⁸ (the) fugitive (objects of sense), not even thinking⁹ of them through contempt (for them), and who being possessed of knowledge destroys desires in this way, becomes, as it were, the death of death (itself), and swallows (it) up⁹. The being who

¹ I.e. its identity with the Brahman.

² I.e. in various forms of life, *Nīlakantha*.

³ The going about in search of enjoyments.

⁴ The contact leads to pondering on them, and that to desire, &c., as described further on.

⁵ Through various lives. Birth and death are certain for him.

⁶ I.e. causes oblivion of his real nature, *Saṅkara*. Cf. the whole train of cause and effect at *Gîtâ*, p. 50 *supra*.

⁷ I.e. the pondering, desire, wrath, &c. As to 'children,' cf. *Kaṭha*, pp. 96 and 123, where *bâla* is contrasted with *dhīra*, as here. The 'good sense' is of help in withstanding the temptations of worldly objects.

⁸ Destroys=abandons; pondering, just before this, is rendered by *Saṅkara* to mean 'thinking of the objects as transient, impure,' &c.

⁹ *Saṅkara* cites on this a stanza of unknown authorship, which says, 'The learned and clever man who knows the self, and by discrimination destroys all objects of sense, is said to be the death of death.' See too p. 178 *infra*.

pursues desires, is destroyed (in pursuing) after the desires¹. But casting away desires, a being gets rid of all taint² whatever. This body, void of enlightenment³, seems (to be) a hell for (all) beings. Those who are avaricious run about⁴, going headlong to a ditch. A man, O Kshatriya! who contemns everything else⁵ learns nothing. To him (the body is) like a tiger made of straw⁶. And this internal self (joined to) delusion and fear⁷ in consequence of wrath and avarice, within your body,—that verily is death⁸. Understanding death⁹ to be thus produced, and adhering to knowledge, one is not afraid of death¹⁰ in this (world). In his province death is destroyed, as a mortal (is destroyed) on arriving in the province of death.

Dhṛitarâshṭra said :

The good, eternal, and most holy worlds¹¹, which

¹ On this *Nilakanṭha* quotes these lines, 'The antelope, elephant, butterfly, bee, and fish—these five are destroyed by the five,' i.e. the five objects of sense, sound, &c. See *Sâṁti Parvan* (*Moksha Dharma*), chap. 174, st. 45.

² I.e. misery, *Nilakanṭha*; merit or sin, *Saṅkara*.

³ I.e. void of discrimination between the real and unreal, *Nilakanṭha*; result of ignorance, *Saṅkara*. 'A hell, as being full of filth,' says *Saṅkara*, 'such as phlegm, blood, excretions.' Cf. *Maitrî*, p. 48.

⁴ As blind men groping about fall into a ditch, so do these, *Saṅkara*.

⁵ I.e. other than the sensuous objects he loves; 'learns nothing' about the supreme Self which he disregards.

⁶ Useless for any good purpose.

⁷ Cf. *Taittirîya-upanishad*, p. 102.

⁸ As being ruinous to oneself. *Saṅkara* compares *Gîtâ*, p. 68. Cf. also *Taittirîya-upanishad*, p. 103, and see *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 61.

⁹ I.e. heedlessness and its developments as stated.

¹⁰ *Saṅkara* cites on this *Taittirîya-upanishad*, p. 78.

¹¹ Such as *Satyâloka*, &c.

are mentioned (as attainable) by the twice-born by means of worship¹, those, say the Vedas, are the highest aim². How is it, then, that one who understands this does not resort to action?

Sanatsugâta said :

(Thinking) so, an ignorant man does resort to action. The Vedas likewise do lay down various benefits³ (for him). But that⁴ (man) comes not hither⁵. (Becoming) the supreme self⁶, he attains the supreme, by the (right) path destroying the wrong paths⁷.

Dhṛitarâshṭra said :

Who⁸ is it that constrains this unborn primeval (self), if it is (itself) all this severally⁹? And what

¹ Gyotish/oma, Arvamedha, and other rites.

² As leading to final emancipation.

³ I.e. objects for which various ceremonies (or 'actions') should be performed.

⁴ I.e. the man of knowledge.

⁵ I.e. into the sphere of action. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 48.

⁶ Knowing the supreme self is identical with becoming the supreme self, *Mundaka*, p. 323.

⁷ I.e. getting rid of the paths which keep one away from the Brahman by means of contemplation of the Brahman, &c. Nîlakantha renders 'right path' to mean the Sushumnâ passage by which the soul proceeds to final emancipation, see *Khândogya*, p. 570; *Katha*, p. 157.

⁸ Saṅkara says: 'Having shown that true death is heedlessness, and having shown that heedlessness in its forms of anger &c. is the cause of all evil, and having also shown that death is destroyed by true knowledge, and having shown further that heaven &c. are really not man's highest goal; the author has also implied the unity of the supreme and individual self. On that arises a doubt, which is stated in this passage.'

⁹ All this=all the developments of the Brahman, i.e. space, wind, fire, water, earth, vegetation, food, living creatures; see *Taittirîyopaniṣad*, p. 68. ❀

has it to do, or what is its unhappiness¹? Tell me all that accurately, O learned person!

Sanatsugâta said :

There is great danger² in attributing distinctions to it. The everlasting³ (principles) exist by connexion with the beginningless⁴ (principle). So that his greatness is not lost at all⁵, and beings exist by connexion with the beginningless⁴ (principle). That which is the real—the supreme Being⁶—is eternal. He creates the universe by means of changes⁷, for such is his power held to be; and for such connexions of things the Vedas are (authority)⁸.

¹ What is the purpose of its existence, and what misery does it undergo on entering the course of worldly life?

² 'The danger,' says Saṅkara, 'is that of contravening Vedic texts such as "I am the Brahman," "Thou art that," &c.' May it not rather be that pointed out at *Kaṭhopanishad*, p. 129, viz. never attaining final emancipation? Cf. also *Nṛsiṃha Tâpinî*, p. 223.

³ The individual selfs, Saṅkara.

⁴ Nature or mâyâ.

⁵ The appearance of degradation to an inferior state being delusive.

⁶ The original word implies the possession of *aisvarya*, *dharma*, *yasas*, *śrî*, *vairâgya*, *moksha*. See *Svetâsvatara*, p. 329 (where the list is slightly different). For another definition, see *Maitrî*, p. 6 (gloss).

⁷ See note 9, p. 156.

⁸ Saṅkara says: 'The question of *Dhṛitarâshṭra* having suggested a difference between two principles, one of which constrains, and the other of which is constrained, the answer is—Such a difference ought not to be alleged, as it involves "danger." Then the question arises, How is the difference, which does appear, to be explained? The reply is, It is due to the beginningless principle—delusion or ignorance. The next sentence shows that the universe as it appears is also a result of delusion.' *Nīlakanṭha* says expressly, changes=delusion. He renders the original which we have translated by 'beginningless' first, to mean 'collection of objects of enjoyments.' Saṅkara's explanation seems tautological as regards the words 'connexion with the beginningless,' which occur twice in the above. *Nīla-*

Dhṛitarâshtra said :

Since some practise piety¹ in this world, and some likewise practise impiety in this world ; is the piety destroyed by the sin, or else does the piety destroy sin ?

Sanatsugâta said :

Whichever² he adheres to, the man of understanding always destroys both by means of knowledge ; (that is) settled³. Likewise, in the other case⁴, the embodied (self) obtains merit ; and to such a one sin (also) accrues ; (that too is) settled³. Departing (from this world), he enjoys by his actions both (kinds of) fruit, which are not enduring⁵—of actions (which are) pure, and of (those which are) sinful. The man of understanding casts aside sin by piety in this (world), for know that his piety is more powerful⁶. Those Brâhmaṇas, in whom there is emulation⁷ about (their) piety, as there is in strong men about (their) strength, after departing from this world, become glorious in heaven⁸. And

kantha's is not quite clear. May the expression on the second occasion mean, that the connexion by which beings are stated before to exist has had no beginning—has existed from eternity? The translation should then run thus : 'And beings exist by a connexion which had no beginning ;' (see Sârîraka Bhâshya, p. 494.) Connexions of things = creation of universe by his power.

¹ E.g. Agnishṭoma, &c., Saṅkara.

² I.e. impiety or piety, sin or merit.

³ In *Srutis* and *Smṛitis*, which Saṅkara quotes. *Khândogya*, p. 622 ; *Mundaka*, p. 309 ; *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 911. See, too, *Maitrî*, p. 131.

⁴ Of the man devoid of knowledge.

⁵ Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 76, and *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 636.

⁶ See p. 164, note 9 *infra*.

⁷ The feeling of one's own superiority over others in piety.

⁸ 'In the shape of Nakshatras,' says Saṅkara, which is not quite intelligible. See *Khândogya*, p. 258, and *Anugîtâ* *infra*, p. 240.

to those in whom there is no emulation about (their) piety, that (piety) is a means of (acquiring) knowledge¹. Such Brâhmanas released from this (world), go to the heaven which is free from the threefold source of pain². People who understand the Vedas call his conduct good. (But) people closely connected³, as well as strangers, do not pay much regard to him. Wherever he may believe food and drink for a Brâhmana to exist in abundance, like water on grass in the autumn, there would he live and not be vexed⁴. (To him) only that person is good, and no other (as a companion), who does nothing in excess, and who occasions fear and injury to a taciturn man⁵. And his food is acceptable to the good, who does not vex the self of a taciturn man, and who does not destroy the property of a Brâhmana⁶. A Brâhmana should hold, that living in the midst of kinsmen, his actions should be always unknown⁷; and he should not

¹ According to the Vedântic theory, the acts of piety purify the inner man, and are thus a stepping-stone to knowledge. See Introduction, p. 147 supra. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 122; and *Brîhadâraṇyaka*, p. 899.

² I.e. physical, mental, and such as is caused by superhuman agency. This is Saṅkara's explanation. It is somewhat far-fetched, but I can find none better. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 49. And see also *Brîhadâraṇyaka*, p. 876, and the commentary of Saṅkara there with Ânandagiri's gloss.

³ E.g. wife, children, &c.

⁴ I.e. vexed as to how his livelihood is to be earned, &c.

⁵ Excess, e.g. too much obsequiousness towards a 'taciturn man,' owing to his holiness, &c. Taciturn man = ascetic. Injury = disrespect, &c. Perhaps the protest against worldliness is here carried to an extreme. Saṅkara cites *Manu* as a parallel, 'A Brâhmana should be afraid of (worldly) respect as of poison.'

⁶ E.g. the Kusa grass, deerskin, &c., mentioned at Gîtâ, p. 68.

⁷ I.e. he should not parade his actions. Saṅkara compares *Vaishya* and a Vedic text. See, too, the quotation at *Taitt. Âraṇ.* p. 902.

think¹ (about them). What Brâhmana ought to think of the inner self, which is void of symbols², immovable, pure, and free from all pairs of opposites, in this way³? What sin is not committed by that thief, who steals away his own self⁴, who regards his self as one thing, when it is a different thing. The far-seeing Brâhmana, who knows the Brahman, is not wearied⁵, he receives nothing⁶; he is honoured, free from trouble⁷, and wise, but acts as if he was not wise⁸. As dogs eat what is vomited, so do they, enjoying their own bravery⁹, eat what is vomited, always with disaster (to themselves). Those twice-born persons, who are not

¹ Cf. Gîtâ, p. 103. Saṅkara suggests an alternative explanation of this stanza, which will make it mean that one performing the operations of the senses, should devote oneself nevertheless to the unknown principle, and not consider the senses to be the self.

² I. e. beyond the reach of inference; 'subtle,' says Saṅkara. (Cf. Svetâsvatara, p. 364; Bṛihadâraṇyaka, p. 855; Maitrî, p. 182; and Katha, p. 149, where Saṅkara suggests a somewhat different meaning. As to immovable, cf. Īsa, p. 10, and Gîtâ, p. 104. Saṅkara renders it by 'void of activity;' and pure he paraphrases by 'free from ignorance and other taints.'

³ It is difficult to say what 'in this way' refers to. Saṅkara renders it by 'as possessing qualities appertaining to the two kinds of body.' On Saṅkara's suggested meaning of the stanza preceding (see note 1), it would refer to the confusion of the senses with the self.

⁴ Such a person is called a destroyer of his own self at Īsopaniṣad, p. 9.

⁵ I. e. by the troubles of worldly life.

⁶ Cf. 'without belongings' at Gîtâ, p. 128.

⁷ Anger and other obstacles to concentration of mind.

⁸ I. e. unintelligent. The text of Vasishṭha referred to in note 7, p. 159, says he should act like an unintelligent man. Cf. also Gaudapâda-kârikâs, p. 443, and Sârîraka Bhâṣhya, p. 1041.

⁹ I. e. singing the praises of their own greatness and worth, instead of keeping their 'conduct unknown.'

first¹ in respect of human wealth, but who are first in the Vedas², are unconquerable, not to be shaken³; they should be understood to be forms of the Brahman. Whosoever may in this (world) know all the gods⁴—doers of favours—he is not equal to a Brâhmana, (nor even) he⁵ for whom he exerts himself. The man who makes no efforts⁶, and is respected, does not, being respected, think himself respected⁷, nor does he become vexed in consequence of disrespect. One who is respected⁸ should think it to be a natural operation of people, like their opening or closing of the eyelids, that the learned respect him in this world. One who is not respected should think, that the deluded people who do not understand piety, and who are devoid of (knowledge of) the world and the Sâstras, will never respect one who is worthy of respect. Respect and taciturnity⁹, verily, never dwell together; for this world is (the field) for respect, the next for taciturnity, as is understood¹⁰. For worldly wealth dwells in the

¹ Highly esteemed for or strongly attached to, Saṅkara. Human wealth=wife, offspring, property, &c. Cf. *Khândogya*, p. 319; *Brhadâraṇyaka*, p. 262.

² I. e. veracity and other duties taught by the Vedas.

³ 'They need fear nought,' says Nîlakaṇṭha.

⁴ I. e. may sacrifice to them, Saṅkara.

⁵ Not even the deity to whom the sacrifice is offered is equal to one who knows the Brahman. Cf. *Taittirîya*, p. 23, and *Anugîtâ*, p. 250.

⁶ I. e. one who is 'taciturn' and does not parade his greatness.

⁷ He does not care for the respect shown him.

⁸ Because he knows the Brahman.

⁹ I. e. restraint of all senses, not of speech only. For the contrast compare that between *sreya* and *preya* at *Kaṭha*, p. 92.

¹⁰ I. e. by all men of understanding. Saṅkara's rendering is different: 'The next, which is known as *Tad*, is for taciturnity.' He cites for this *Gîtâ*, p. 120.

sphere of respect¹, and that, too, is an obstacle². While the Brahmic wealth³, O Kshatriya! is difficult to be attained by any one devoid of knowledge. The ways (to it) are stated by the good to be of various descriptions, and difficult to reach—truth, straightforwardness, modesty⁴, restraint (of senses), purity, knowledge, which are the six impediments (in the way) of respect and delusion.

CHAPTER III.

Dhṛitarâshṭra said :

Who possesses this taciturnity⁵, and which of the two⁶ is taciturnity? Describe, O learned person! the condition of taciturnity here. Does a learned man reach taciturnity⁷ by taciturnity? And how, O sage! do they practise taciturnity in this world?

¹ I. e. they both follow on devotion to worldly life.

² I. e. in the way to final emancipation.

³ The enjoyment of supreme felicity, Brahmânanda (Sāṅkara); the greatness consisting of a knowledge of *Rik*, *Yagus*, *Sâman*, and the substance of their teaching, which is worthy of a Brâhmana (Nîlakantha). See, too, Anugâtâ, p. 232.

⁴ Modesty=being ashamed of doing wrong; restraint (of senses)=mental restraint; and purity is both internal and external,—Sāṅkara; knowledge is, of course, knowledge of the Brahman.

⁵ I. e. that spoken of in the last chapter.

⁶ Viz. mere silence, or the contemplation of the self after restraining all the senses. In the *Bṛhadâraṇyaka-upanishad*, Sāṅkara (p. 605) renders the original word, *mauna*, to mean, 'The fruit of the destruction of the consciousness of anything other than the self.' And his commentator makes it clearer thus: 'The conviction in the mind that one is the self—the supreme Brahman—and that there is nothing else existing but oneself.'

⁷ I. e. the highest seat—the Brahman; for mind, sense, &c. are all non-existent there. Cf. *Kaṭha*, p. 151, and *Maitrî*, p. 161.

Sanatsugâta said :

Since the Vedas, together with the mind ¹, fail to attain to him, hence (is he) taciturnity ²—he about whom the words of the Vedas were uttered ³, and who, O king! shines forth as consubstantial ⁴ with them.

Dhrîtarâshtra said :

Does ⁵ the twice-born person who studies the *Rîk* and the Yagus texts, and the Sâma-veda, committing sinful (acts), become tainted, or does he not become tainted ?

Sanatsugâta said :

Not the Sâman texts, nor yet the *Rîk* texts, nor the Yagus texts ⁶ save him, O acute sir! from sinful

¹ Cf. Kenopanishad, p. 39; *Kaṭha*, p. 152; Taittirîya, p. 119.

² 'Taciturnity is his name,' says Nîlakantha.

³ Or, says Saṅkara, 'who is the author of the Vedas.'

⁴ I. e. 'with the Vedas,' says Nîlakantha, Om, the quintessence of the Vedas, being a name of the Brahman (as to which cf. Gîtâ, p. 79, and Maitrî, p. 84). Saṅkara takes the whole expression to mean *gvotirmaya*, consisting of light. Nîlakantha says this stanza answers the five following questions put in the stanza preceding, viz. of what use is taciturnity? which of the two is taciturnity? &c., as above. The first four questions are answered by the first two lines of this stanza—the substance of the answer being, that the use of taciturnity is to attain the seat which is not to be grasped even by the mind, that taciturnity includes both restraint of mind and of the external senses. By means of such restraint, the external and internal worlds cease to be perceived as existing, and the highest goal is attained.

⁵ This question arises naturally enough on Nîlakantha's interpretation of the preceding stanza, the meaning of which is in substance that the Vedas cannot grasp the Brahman fully, but they are of use towards a rudimentary comprehension of it, as is said further on, see p. 172 infra.

⁶ Cf. Svetâsvatara-upanishad, p. 339; see, too, *Nṛisimha Tâpinî*, pp. 81–98.

action. I do not tell you an untruth. The *Khandas* do not save a sinful deceitful¹ man who behaves deceitfully². At the time of the termination (of his life), the *Khandas* abandon³ him, as birds who have got wings (abandon their) nest.

Dhr̥itarāsh̥tra said :

If, O acute sir! the Vedas are not able to save one who understands the Vedas, then whence is this eternal talk⁴ of the Brāhmanas?

Sanatsugâta said :

O you of great glory! this universe becomes manifest through his special forms—names⁵ and the rest. The Vedas proclaim (his form) after describing (it) well⁶, and (they⁷ also) state his difference from the universe. For that⁸ are this penance and sacrifice prescribed. By these a learned man acquires merit, and afterwards destroying sin by merit⁹, he has his self illuminated by knowledge. By knowledge the learned man attains

¹ I. e. one who parades his piety.

² I. e. hypocritically.

³ I. e. do not rise to his memory—*Nilakantha*, citing *Gîtâ*, p. 78 supra.

⁴ Scil. about the veneration due to one who has studied the Vedas—*Nilakantha*, citing one or two passages in point.

⁵ The universe consists of 'names and forms,' the reality being the Brahman only. Cf. *Khândogya*, p. 407 seq.

⁶ Saṅkara refers to *Taittiriya-upanishad*, p. 68; *Khândogya*, p. 596 seq. &c.

⁷ Saṅkara takes this to mean 'sages,' who, according to him, state the difference. He quotes *Parâsara* for this.

⁸ I. e. the Brahman, that is to say, for attaining to it. Penance = *kāṇḍr̥āyana* and other observances; sacrifice = *gyotish/oma*, &c.

⁹ Cf. p. 158 supra, and *Taittiriya-âranyaka*, p. 888.

the self¹. But, on the other hand, one who wishes for the fruit—heaven²—takes with him³ all that he has done in this (world), enjoys it in the next, and then returns to the path⁴ (of this world). Penance is performed in this world; the fruit is enjoyed elsewhere. But the penance of Brâhmanas is further developed⁵; that of others remains only as much (as when first performed).

Dhṛitarâshtra said :

How does the pure penance become developed and well developed⁶? O Sanatsugâta! tell (me) how I should understand that, O Lord!

Sanatsugâta said :

This penance, free from sin⁷, is called pure⁸; and this pure penance becomes developed and well developed, not otherwise⁹. All this¹⁰, O Kshatriya!

¹ Cf. Svetâsvatara, p. 327; Mundaka, p. 323.

² So Saṅkara. Nîlakantha takes the original word to mean 'the group of the senses,' and the whole phrase to mean 'enjoyments of sense.' Nîlakantha is supported by a passage further on, p. 167. But as to 'those who wish for heaven,' cf. Gîtâ, pp. 48-84.

³ I.e. in the form of merit, &c.

⁴ Cf. Gîtâ, p. 84.

⁵ Cf. Khândogya, p. 23. Brâhmanas=those that know the Brahman. See p. 171 infra.

⁶ I am not quite sure about the meaning of the original here. Riddha, which I have rendered 'developed,' Nîlakantha understands to mean 'what is performed merely for show.' What has been rendered 'well developed' in the text, Nîlakantha takes to mean 'performed from some desire,' &c.

⁷ Anger, desire, &c.

⁸ The original is kevala. Nîlakantha says it is so called as being a means of kaivalya, 'final emancipation.'

⁹ I.e. not that which is not free from sin, which latter is not developed at all.

¹⁰ All objects of enjoyment, Nîlakantha.

has for its root that penance about which you question me. By penance¹, those conversant with the Vedas attained immortality, after departing from this world.

Dhṛitarâshṭra said :

I have heard about penance free from sin, O Sanatsugâta ! Tell me what is the sin (connected) with penance, so that I may understand the eternal mystery².

Sanatsugâta said :

The twelve beginning with wrath, and likewise the seven cruelties, are the defects (connected) with it; and there are (stated) in the Sâstras twelve merits (connected) with it, beginning with knowledge, which are known to the twice-born, and may be developed. Wrath, desire³, avarice, delusion⁴, craving⁵, mercilessness, censoriousness, vanity, grief⁶, attachment⁷, envy⁸, reviling others—these twelve should always be avoided by a man of high quali-

¹ Cf. *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 899. Tapas is variously rendered. See inter alia, *Prasna*, pp. 162-170; *Svetâsvatara*, p. 307; *Mundaka*, pp. 270-280, 311-314; *Khândogya*, p. 136; *Anugîtâ*, pp. 247, 339.

² I.e. Brahma-vidyâ, or science of the Brahman, *Nilakantha*; the Brahman itself, *Saṅkara*.

³ I. e. lust.

⁴ Want of discrimination between right and wrong.

⁵ Desire to taste worldly objects. •

⁶ For the loss of anything desired.

⁷ Desire to enjoy worldly objects. The difference between this and craving, according to *Saṅkara*, appears to be between merely tasting and continual enjoyment. According to *Nilakantha*, the former is a desire which is never contented; the latter is merely a general liking.

⁸ Impatience of other people's prosperity; censoriousness being the pointing out of flaws in other people's merits; and reviling being an ignoring of the merits and merely abusing.

fications¹. These, O king of kings! attend each and every man, wishing to find some opening², as a hunter (watches) animals. [Boastful, lustful, haughty, irascible, unsteady³, one who does not protect (those dependent⁴ on him), these six sinful acts are performed by sinful men who are not afraid (even) in the midst of great danger⁵.] One whose thoughts are (all) about enjoyments, who prospers by injuring (others), who repents of generosity, who is miserly, who is devoid of the power⁶ (of knowledge), who esteems the group⁷ (of the senses), who hates his wife⁸—these seven, different (from those previously mentioned), are the seven forms of cruelty. Knowledge, truth, self-restraint, sacred learning, freedom from animosity (towards living beings), modesty⁹, endurance¹⁰, freedom from censoriousness, sacrifice, gift, courage¹¹, quiescence¹²,—these are the twelve great observances¹³ of a Brâhmana. Whoever is not devoid of these twelve can govern this whole world, and those who are

¹ Scil. for attaining to the Brahman.

² Some weak point by which they may attack a man.

³ Fickle in friendship, &c.

⁴ Such as a wife, &c.

⁵ Connected with this or the next world, *Nîlâñtha*. This and a stanza further on I place within brackets, as it is not quite certain whether Sâṅkara's copy had them, though they are now in of our copies of the text with his commentary. See Introduction.

⁶ Cf. *Mundaka*, p. 319; *Khândogya*, p. 494.

⁷ See note 2, at page 165.

⁸ The wife having no other protector.

⁹ See note 4, at page 162.

¹⁰ Of pairs of opposites, such as heat and cold, &c.

¹¹ Restraint of senses in presence of their objects.

¹² Cf. *Gîtâ*, pp. 69, 70.

¹³ Which are serviceable in attaining the highest goal.

possessed of three, two, or even one (of these) become, in (due) course, distinguished (for knowledge) and identified with the Brahman¹. [Self-restraint, abandonment², and freedom from heedlessness—on these depends immortality. And the talented Brâhmanas say that truth is chief over them.] Self-restraint has eighteen defects; if (any one of them is) committed, it is an obstacle (to self-restraint). They are thus stated. Untruthfulness, backbiting, thirst³, antipathy (to all beings), darkness⁴, repining⁵, hatred⁶ of people, haughtiness, quarrelsomeness, injuring living creatures, reviling others, garbule, vexation⁷, want of endurance⁸, want of courage⁹, imperfection¹⁰, sinful conduct, and slaughter. That is called self-restraint by the good, which is free from these defects. Frenzy has eighteen defects¹¹; and abandonment is of six kinds. The contraries of those which have been laid down¹² are stated to be the defects of frenzy. Abandonment of six kinds is excellent. Of those six, the third is hard to achieve. With it one certainly crosses

¹ The original is the word 'taciturnity' as at p. 162 supra.

² Offering one's acts to God (*Nilakantha*), as to which cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 64. See also p. 182 infra for this stanza.

³ I. e. for objects of sense.

⁴ Ignorance.

⁵ Discontent even when one obtains much.

⁶ This is active; antipathy is passive only.

⁷ Of oneself, by brooding on evil. Cf. *Taittirîya*, p. 119. One copy of *Saṅkara's* commentary says this means 'thinking ill of others without cause.'

⁸ Of pairs of opposites.

⁹ Restraint of senses in presence of their objects.

¹⁰ I. e. of piety, knowledge, and indifference to worldly objects.

¹¹ I. e. qualities which destroy it.

¹² Scil. as defects of self-restraint, viz. untruthfulness, &c.

beyond all misery without distinction¹. That being achieved, (everything) is accomplished². The (first is the) giving away of sons and wealth to a deserving man who asks (for them); the second is gifts at Vedic ceremonies, and gifts at ceremonies laid down in the *Smṛitis*³. The abandonment of desires, O king of kings! by means of indifference (to worldly objects) is laid down as the third⁴. With these one should become free from heedlessness. That freedom from heedlessness, too, has eight characteristics, and is (a) great (merit). Truthfulness, concentration, absorbed contemplation, reflexion⁵, and also indifference (to worldly objects), not stealing⁶, living the life of a *Brahmakârin*, and

¹ Scil. any distinction as to physical, mental, or that which is caused by superhuman agency.

² Literally, 'all is conquered.' Everything that needs to be done is done. Cf. *Kaṭhopanishad*, p. 155; *Mundaka*, p. 317.

³ Another interpretation of *ishâpūrta* is 'offerings to gods, and offerings to the manes;' a third 'sacrifices, &c., and works of charity, such as digging tanks and wells;' for a fourth, see *Saṅkara on Mundaka*, p. 291.

⁴ Each of the three classes mentioned contains two sub-classes, and so the six are made up. It is not quite easy to see the two heads under the third class; but perhaps indifference, and the consequent abandonment of desire, may be the two intended. To indicate that, I have adopted the construction which takes the words 'by means of indifference' with abandonment, instead of with 'gifts at Vedic ceremonies,' &c. *Saṅkara* seems to understand 'giving away of wealth' with the words 'by means of indifference,' and thus to constitute the second head under the third class. But he is not quite clear.

⁵ Concentration=fixing the mind continuously on some object, such as the being in the sun, &c.; contemplation is that in which one identifies oneself with the Brahman; reflexion as to what one is, whence one comes, and so forth.

⁶ *Saṅkara* says this may refer to the 'stealing' mentioned at p. 160. The life of a *Brahmakârin* is here taken to mean con-

likewise freedom from all belongings¹. Thus have the defects of self-restraint been stated; one should avoid those defects. Freedom from (those) defects is freedom from heedlessness; and that, too, is deemed to have eight characteristics². Let truth be your (very) self, O king of kings! On truth all the worlds rest³. Truth is said to be their main (principle). Immortality depends on truth⁴. Getting rid of (these) defects, one should practise the observance of penance. This is the conduct prescribed by the Creator. Truth is the solemn vow of the good. The pure penance, which is free from these defects, and possessed of these characteristics, becomes developed, and well developed⁵. I will state to you, in brief, O king of kings! what you ask of me. This (observance)⁶ is destructive of sin, and pure, and releases (one) from birth and death and old age⁷. If one is free from the five senses, and also from the mind⁸, O descendant of Bharata! also from (thoughts regarding) the past and the future⁹, one becomes happy.

Dhṛitarâshṭra said :

Some people make great boasts in consequence of (their knowing) the Vedas with the Âkhyânas as

tinence by the commentators, as also at *Mundaka*, p. 311 inter alia. See also *Khândogya*, p. 533.

¹ Son; wife, home, &c.; as to which cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 103, and *Nṛsiṃha Tâpinî*, p. 198, commentary.

² The eight mentioned already. ³ Cf. *Taitt. Âraṇ.* p. 885.

⁴ Cf. *Mundaka*, p. 312; *Sânti Parvan (Moksha)*, chap. 199, st. 64 seq. Immortality = final emancipation.

⁵ P. 165 supra. ⁶ Of penance, that is to say.

⁷ Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 109 for the collocation.

⁸ *Kaṭhopanishad*, p. 151; *Maitrî*, p. 161. Saṅkara seems to take the five and the senses separately; the five meaning the five classes of sensuous objects. ⁹ Past losses and future gains, *Nilakanṭha*.

the fifth¹; others, likewise, are (masters) of four Vedas; others, too, of three Vedas; others are (masters) of two Vedas, and of one Veda; and others of no Veda². Tell me which of these is the greatest, whom I may know (to be) a Brâhmaṇa.

Sanatsugâta said :

Through ignorance of the one Veda³—the one truth—O king of kings! numerous Vedas came into existence. Some⁴ only adhere to the truth. The fancies of those who have fallen away from the truth are abortive, and through ignorance of the truth, ceremonies become amplified⁵. One should understand a Brâhmaṇa, who (merely) reads much, to be a man of many words⁶. Know him only to be the (true) Brâhmaṇa, who swerves not from the truth⁷. O you who are the highest among men⁸! the Kṛāṇḍas, indeed, refer of themselves⁹ to it. There-

¹ Cf., as to this, Max Müller's Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p. 38 seq.; and Kṛāṇḍogya, pp. 164, 474, 493; Brîhadâraṇyaka, pp. 456, 687, 926; Maitrî, p. 171; Nṛsiṃha Tâpinî, p. 105.

² The original is 'void of *Riks*.' The commentators give no explanation. Does it mean those who abandon the karma-mârga? Heretics who reject all Vedas are scarcely likely to be referred to in this way. Nîlakaṇṭha's interpretation of all this is very different. See his gloss.

³ Saṅkara gives various interpretations of this. Perhaps the best is to take it as meaning knowledge. 'The one knowledge—the one truth'—would then be like the famous text—Taittirîya, p. 56—'The Brahman is truth, knowledge,' &c.

⁴ For this phrase cf. Gîtâ, p. 73.

⁵ Those who do not understand the Brahman lose their natural power of obtaining what they wish, and so go in for various ceremonies for various special benefits. Cf. Kṛāṇḍogya, p. 541; Gîtâ, p. 47; and p. 184 infra.

⁶ Cf. Brîhadâraṇyaka, p. 893.

⁷ Ibid p. 636.

⁸ Literally, 'highest among bipeds,' a rather unusual expression.

⁹ Nîlakaṇṭha says, 'The part of the Vedas which teaches the

fore, studying them, the learned persons who understand the *Khandas*, attain to the Veda, not that which is to be known¹. Among the Vedas, there is none which understands². By the unintelligent³, one understands not the Veda, nor the object of knowledge⁴. He who knows the Veda knows the object of knowledge. He who knows the object of knowledge⁵ knows not the truth. He who understands the Vedas understands also the object of knowledge; but that⁶ is not understood by the Vedas or by those who understand the Vedas. Still the Brâhmaṇas who understand the Vedas, understand the Veda by means of the Vedas⁷. As the branch of a tree with regard to the part of a portion of the glorious⁸ one, so, they declare, are the Vedas with

knowledge of the supreme is enough by itself for its purpose; it is not like the part about rites, &c., which rites must be performed before they serve any useful purpose.' The *Gñānakāṇḍa* is enough by itself for understanding the Brahman. Saṅkara compares *Gitā*, p. 113, and *Kaṭha*, p. 102.

¹ The Veda=the Brahman, as above, cf. *Svetâsvatara*, p. 372 and commentary; that which is to be known=the material world, which is a subject for human knowledge.

² Scil. understands the Veda—the Brahman.

³ 'The mind,' says Nîlakanṭha; literally, 'that which is to be understood.'

⁴ Because a real knowledge of it requires a knowledge of the Brahman. As to the next clause cf. inter alia *Khândogya*, p. 384; *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 450.

⁵ This is the converse of the last sentence, as to which cf. *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 925.

⁶ The supreme.

⁷ The apparent contradiction is explained in the next sentence.

⁸ I.e. the moon. This refers to the well-known *sâkhâkandranâya*. As the small digit of the moon, which cannot be perceived by itself, is pointed out as being at the tip of a branch of a tree pointing towards the moon, so the Vedas are of use as pointing towards the Brahman, though inaccurately and imperfectly.

regard to the subject of understanding the supreme self. I understand him to be a Brâhmaṇa who is ingenious, and explains¹ (Vedic texts). He who apprehends (those texts) thus², does verily know that supreme (principle). One should not go in search of it among (things) antagonistic³ to it at all. Not looking (for him there) one sees that Lord by means of the Veda⁴. Remaining quiet, one should practise devotion, and should not even form a wish in the mind⁵. To him the Brahman presents⁶ itself, and directly afterwards he attains to the perfect⁷ (one). By taciturnity⁸, verily, does one become a sage; (one does) not (become) a sage by dwelling in a forest⁹. And he is called the highest sage, who understands that indestructible (principle). One is called an analyser¹⁰ (also) in consequence of

¹ Scil. in the manner just indicated.

² As giving an idea of the Brahman. The first step to a knowledge of the Brahman is to 'hear' about it from Vedic texts. Cf. *Bṛhadâraṇyaka*, p. 925.

³ Such as the body, the senses, &c., which must be distinguished as quite distinct from the self, though most often confounded with it.

⁴ Such passages, namely, as 'Thou art that, I am the Brahman,' &c.

⁵ About the objects of the senses.

⁶ Cf. *Kaṭha*, p. 155.

⁷ Cf. *Khândogya*, p. 516. The Bhûman there is the same as the Bahu here, viz. the Brahman. Saṅkara says expressly in his comment on the Upanishad text, that Bahu and Bhûman, among other words, are synonyms.

⁸ Self-restraint, as explained before at p. 163.

⁹ Though this is not unimportant, as may be seen from the contrast between town and forest at *Khândogya*, p. 340. See also *Maitrî*, p. 100; *Mundaka*, p. 240. As to the 'highest sage,' see *Bṛhadâraṇyaka*, p. 899, where the passage about 'sacrifice, gift, penance' should be compared with *Gîtâ*, p. 122.

¹⁰ The construction in the original is not quite clear. I understand the sense to be as follows: In the science of the soul, the

analysing all objects. The analysis (is) from that as the root; and as he makes (such an) analysis, hence is he so (called). The man who sees the worlds directly sees everything¹. A Brâhmana, verily, adhering to the truth, understands it, and becomes omniscient. I say to you, O learned man! that adhering to knowledge and the rest² in this way, one sees the Brahman, O Kshatriya! by means of a course (of study) in the Vedas³.

CHAPTER IV.

Dhr̥itarâsh̥tra said :

O Sanatsugâta! since you have spoken these words of highest significance, relating to the Brahman, and of numerous forms⁴, give me that advice which is excellent, and difficult to obtain in the

analyser (the word is the same as the word for grammarian) is he who analyses objects, not words merely. Now the true analysis of objects reduces them all to the Brahman (cf. *Khândogya*, p. 407; *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 152); and the sage understands this, and makes the analysis accordingly, so he is rightly called an analyser.

¹ This again is not clear, and the discrepancies of the MSS. make it more perplexing. The meaning, I take to be, that a man may perceive all material things, such as the worlds, Bhûr, &c. (as the commentators put it), but to be really omniscient, you must have knowledge of the truth—the Brahman. See *Sabhâ Parvan*, chapter V, stanza 7. And see, too, *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 613.

² P. 167 *supra*.

³ 'Hearing the Vedântas—Upanishads,' &c., says Saṅkara. See note 2 *supra*, p. 173.

⁴ Does this mean referring to many aspects of the Brahman? Saṅkara merely says nânârûpâ. *Nilakantha* takes it differently, and as meaning that in which everything is elucidated; 'relating to the Brahman' *Nilakantha* takes to mean 'leading to the Brahman,' or 'instrument for attaining to the Brahman.'

midst of these created objects¹. Such is my request, O youth!

Sanatsugâta said :

This Brahman, O king! about which you question me with such perseverance, is not to be attained by anybody who is in a hurry. When the mind is absorbed in the understanding², then can that knowledge, which must be deeply pondered over, be attained by living the life of a Brahmacârin³. For you are speaking of that primordial knowledge⁴, which consists in the truth; which is obtained by the good by living the life of Brahmacârins⁵; which being obtained, men cast off this mortal world; and which knowledge, verily, is to be invariably (found) in those who have been brought up under preceptors⁶.

Dhṛitarâshṭra said :

Since that knowledge is capable of being truly acquired by living the life of a Brahmacârin, therefore tell me, O Brâhmaṇa! of what description the life of a Brahmacârin is⁷.

Sanatsugâta said :

Those who entering (as it were) the womb⁸ of a

¹ In this material world, the highest knowledge is not to be got. Cf. *Kaṭha*, p. 96.

² I. e. withdrawn from objects and fixed on the self only. Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 79, and *Maitrî*, p. 179, where, however, we have *hrîd* for *buddhi*.

³ *Virokâna* and *Indra* do so according to the *Khândogya*, p. 570. See also *Mundaka*, p. 311.

⁴ The object of which is the primal Brahman.

⁵ Cf. *Khândogya*, p. 534; and *Gîtâ*, pp. 78, 79, and the passage from the *Kaṭha* there cited.

⁶ *Khândogya*, pp. 264-459.

⁷ See *Khândogya*, p. 553 seq.

⁸ I. e. attending closely upon him; foetus=pupil.

preceptor, and becoming (as it were) a foetus, practise the life of Brahma $\acute{c}$ ârins, become even in this world authors of Sâstras¹, and they repair to the highest truth² after casting off (this) body. They subjugate desires here in this world, practising forbearance in pursuit of the Brahmic state³; and with courage, they even here remove the self out of the body⁴, like the soft fibres from the Muñga. Father and mother, O descendant of Bharata! only form the body. But the birth⁵ obtained from the preceptor, that verily is true⁶, and likewise immortal. He perfects⁷ (one), giving (one) immortality. Recognising what he has done (for one), one should not injure him. The disciple should always make obeisance to the preceptor⁸; and, free from heedlessness, should always desire sacred instruction. When the pure man obtains knowledge by this same course of discipleship⁹, that is the first quarter of his life as a Brahma $\acute{c}$ ârin. As (is) his conduct

¹ Learned, men of knowledge, Saṅkara.

² The supreme, which is described as 'truth, knowledge,' &c. In our ancient works the truth often means the real.

³ The state of being absorbed in the Brahman. Cf. Gîtâ, p. 52.

⁴ Cf. Kāṭha, p. 158.

⁵ Saṅkara cites Āpastamba (p. 11) in support of this, and Prasna-upanishad, p. 256. The consciousness of being one with the Brahman is a new birth. See, too, Mundaka, p. 282.

⁶ That birth is not merely delusive, and does not result in death.

⁷ Immortality or final emancipation is not to be achieved without knowledge, which can only be got from a preceptor. And one is not perfect without that immortality; one is limited by the conditions of human existence. See Nirukta (Roth's ed.), p. 41.

⁸ Saṅkara compares Svetâsvatara, p. 374; see also p. 203 infra. The necessity of having a Guru is often insisted on even in the Upanishads. Cf. Mundaka, p. 282; Kāṇḍogya, p. 264.

⁹ Stated at the beginning of this speech, Saṅkara.

always towards his preceptor, so likewise should he behave towards the preceptor's wife, and so likewise should he act towards the preceptor's son—(that) is said to be the second quarter. What one, recognising what the preceptor has done for one, and understanding the matter¹ (taught), feels with a delighted heart regarding the preceptor—believing that one has been brought into existence² by him—that is the third quarter of life as a Brahma-kârin. One should do what is agreeable to the preceptor, by means of one's life and riches, and in deed, thought, and word³—that is said to be the fourth quarter. (A disciple) obtains a quarter by time⁴, so likewise a quarter by associating with the preceptor, he also obtains a quarter by means of his own energy; and then he attains to a quarter by means of the Sâstras. The life as a Brahma-kârin of that man, whose beauty⁵ consists in the twelve beginning with knowledge, and whose limbs are the other (qualifications mentioned), and who has

¹ The meaning of the Vedic texts, &c., Saṅkara in one copy; the highest aim of man, according to another copy.

² See note 5 on p. 176.

³ I keep the order of the original, though I do not translate quite literally; 'thought and word' should be literally 'mind and speech.' See, on the collocation, Gîtâ, p. 123 *inter alia*.

⁴ Time=maturity of understanding which comes by time; energy=intellectual power; Sâstras=consultation about Sâstras with fellow-students—Saṅkara, who adds that the order is not material as stated, and quotes a stanza which may be thus rendered, 'The pupil receives a quarter from the preceptor, a quarter by his own talent; he receives a quarter by time; and a quarter through fellow-Brahma-kârins.

⁵ The body being disregarded, these qualities are attributed to the self in this way. For the twelve, see p. 167; the others are abandonment, truthfulness, &c., p. 169.

strength¹, bears fruit, they say, by association with a preceptor, in (the shape of) contact with that entity—the Brahman. Whatever wealth may come to a man who lives in this way, he should even pay that over to the preceptor. He would thus be adopting the conduct of the good which is of many merits; and the same conduct is (to be adopted) towards the preceptor's son. Living thus, he prospers greatly² on all sides in this world; he obtains sons and position; the quarters³ and sub-quarters shower (benefits⁴) on him, and men pass their lives as Brahmaçârins under him. By this life as a Brahmaçârin, the divinities obtained their divinity. And the sages, too, became great by living the life of Brahmaçârins. By this same (means), too, the Apsarasas, together with the Gandharvas, achieved for themselves beautiful forms. And by this life as a Brahmaçârin, the sun illuminates (the universe). That man of knowledge, O king! who practising penance, may by penance pierce through or tear off his body, crosses beyond childhood⁵ by means of this (life as a Brahmaçârin), and at the time of the termination (of life) overcomes death⁶. Those who understand this (life as a Brahmaçârin) attain to a

¹ To observe the duties referred to, Saṅkara. But see, too, p. 167, note 6.

² 'Obtains wealth, learning, and greatness,' says a commentator. For similar benefits, cf. *Khândogya*, p. 122.

³ Cf. *Khândogya*, p. 132.

⁴ 'Wealth,' says Nīlakaṇṭha, as well as another commentator.

⁵ Ignorance; cf. 'note 7 at p. 154 supra. Nīlakaṇṭha reads 'reaches' instead of 'crosses beyond,' and interprets 'bālya' to mean 'freedom from affection, aversion,' &c. Cf. *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 605. As to the divinity of divinities, cf. Taitt. Âraṇ. p. 886.

⁶ Nīlakaṇṭha reads 'vanquishes death.' The meaning is, he reaches final emancipation. Cf. p. 154 supra.

condition like that of those who ask (for what they want) from the wish-granting stone¹, when they obtain the thing desired. By performing action, O Kshatriya! people conquer (for themselves only) perishable worlds². (But) the man of understanding attains by knowledge to the everlasting glory—for there is no other way to it³.

Dhṛitarāshṭra said :

Where a Brāhmaṇa possessed of knowledge, perceives it, does it appear as white⁴, as red, or again as black, or again as grey or tawny? What is the colour of that immortal, indestructible goal?

Sanatsugāta said :

It appears not as white, as red, nor again as black, nor again as grey, nor tawny⁵. It dwells not on earth, nor in the sky; nor does it bear a body in this ocean⁶(-like world). It is not in the stars, nor does it dwell in the lightning; nor is its form⁷ to be seen in the clouds, nor even in the air, nor in the deities; it is not to be seen in the moon, nor in the sun. It is not to be seen in *Rik* texts, nor in

¹ Called *Kintāmani*. The effect of Brahma-kārya is that those who practise it can get what they desire.

² Cf. *Gītā*, p. 76; *Khândogya*, p. 538; *Mundaka*, p. 279.

³ Cf. *Svetâsvatara*, p. 327. ⁴ Cf. *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 877.

⁵ Cf. *Kāṭha*, p. 119; and *Mundaka*, p. 267. As to its not dwelling in earth, sky, &c., Saṅkara refers to *Khândogya*, p. 518, as implying that.

⁶ Literally, 'it bears no water in the ocean.' 'Water' is said by the commentators to mean the five elements of which the body is composed. See *Manu* I, 5, and *Khândogya*, p. 330. In the *Svetâsvatara* it signifies mind (see p. 388). For ocean meaning world, or *samsâra*; cf. *Aitareya-upanishad*, p. 182.

⁷ Here I do not render *rûpa* by colour, as before.

Yagus texts; nor yet in the Atharvan texts, nor in the pure Sâman texts; nor yet, O king, in the Rathantara or *Bṛihadratha*¹ hymns. It is seen in the self of a man of high vows². It is invincible, beyond darkness³, it comes forth from within⁴ at the time of destruction. Its form is more minute than the most minute (things), its form is larger even than the mountains⁵. That is the support⁶ (of the universe); that is immortal; (that is) all things perceptible⁷. That is the Brahman, that is glory⁸. From that all entities were produced⁹, in that they are dissolved. All this shines forth as dwelling in it in the form of light¹⁰. And it is perceived by means of knowledge¹¹ by one who understands the self; on it depends this whole universe. Those who understand this become immortal.

¹ See Muir, Sanskrit Texts, vol. i, p. 16; *Tândya-brâhmana*, p. 838; *Gîtâ*, p. 90; and Kaushîtaki, p. 21. *Bṛihadratha*=*Brihat-sâman* (?).

² The twelve great vows—knowledge, &c., mentioned above, see p. 167. *Nîlakantha* takes *Mahâvrata* to refer to the sacrifice of that name. It is described in the *Aitareya Âranyaka*.

³ See *Gîtâ*, p. 78, note 4.

⁴ Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 82, and *Îsopanishad*, p. 12.

⁵ See *Gîtâ*, p. 78, note 3.

⁶ Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 113; *Kaṭha*, p. 99.

⁷ So *Nîlakantha*. The original word ordinarily means 'worlds.'

⁸ Cf. *Svetâsvatara*, p. 347.

⁹ Cf. the famous passage in the *Taittirîya*, p. 123: and also *Mundaka*, p. 289.

¹⁰ The explanations of the commentators are not quite clear as to the word *ahnâ*, 'in the form of light.' Probably the meaning is: The universe depends on the Brahman, and is, as it were, the light of the Brahman. *San̄kara* compares the passages referred to at *Gîtâ*, p. 112, note 1.

¹¹ 'Not by means of action,' says *San̄kara*.

CHAPTER V¹.

Grief and wrath, and avarice, desire, delusion, laziness, want of forgiveness, vanity, craving, friendship², censoriousness, and reviling others—these twelve great enormities are destructive of a man's life. These, O king of kings! attend on each and every man. Beset by these, a man, deluded in his understanding, acts sinfully. A man full of attachments, merciless, harsh (of speech), talkative, cherishing wrath in his heart, and boastful—these are the men of cruel qualities; (such) persons, even obtaining wealth, do not always enjoy (it)³. One

¹ The whole of this chapter is wanting in one of our copies of Saṅkara's commentary. In the copy published in the Mahābhārata (Madras edition) there is, however, this passage: 'Wrath &c. have been already explained, still there are some differences here and there, and those only are now explained.' The chapter is for the most part a repetition of what we have already had. For such repetitions cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, pp. 317-1016; 444-930. The same copy of Saṅkara's commentary gives this general statement of the object of this and the next chapter: 'The course of study of the science of the Brahman, in which knowledge is the principal thing, and concentration of mind &c. are subsidiary, has been described. Now is described the course of study in which concentration of mind is principal, and knowledge subsidiary. The first mode consists in understanding the meaning of the word "you" by means of concentration of mind, and then identifying it with the Brahman by means of a study of the Upanishads; the second, in first intellectually understanding the identity of the individual self and Brahman, by such study of the Upanishads, and then realising the identity to consciousness by contemplation, &c. In both modes the fruit is the same, and the means are the same; and to show this, the merits and defects already stated are here again declared.' This explanation is verbatim the same in *Nilakantha's* commentary.

² The original is 'pity,' which is explained to mean 'friendship' by Saṅkara and *Nilakantha*.

³ 'Owing to there being in it no enjoyment for the self,' says one

whose thoughts are fixed on enjoyments, who is partial¹, proud², boastful when he makes a gift, miserly, and devoid of power³, who esteems the group (of the senses), and who hates (his) wife—thus have been stated the seven (classes of) cruel persons of sinful dispositions. Piety, and truthfulness, and penance, and self-restraint, freedom from animosity, modesty, endurance, freedom from censoriousness, liberality, sacred learning, courage, forgiveness—these are the twelve great observances of a Brâhmaṇa. Whoever does not swerve from these twelve may govern this whole world. And one who is possessed of three, two, or even one, of these, must be understood to have nothing of his own⁴. Self-restraint, abandonment, freedom from delusion, on these immortality depends⁵. These are possessed by those talented Brâhmaṇas to whom the Brahman is the principal⁶ (thing). A Brâhmaṇa's speaking ill of others, whether true or false, is not commended.

copy of Saṅkara's commentary. Another reading, which is in the Madras edition and in *Nilakantha*, may be rendered, 'even obtaining benefits, they do not respect one (from whom they obtain them).'

¹ The commentary says the meaning is the same as that of the expression used in the corresponding place before, viz. one who prospers by injuring others.

² One copy of Saṅkara's commentary takes this to mean one who thinks the not-self to be the self. I adopt the other meaning, however, as agreeing with that of *atimânî*, which is the reading of some copies instead of *abhimânî*.

³ *Nilakantha* reads *durbala* and does not explain it. See p. 167.

⁴ One commentator says this means that he should not be supposed to have incurred the demerit of having any attachment to this world. *Nilakantha* says, he gives up everything in the pursuit of even one of these observances. ⁵ See p. 168.

⁶ I. e. the goal to be reached. The commentary takes Brahman to mean the Vedas, and the whole phrase to mean those who devote themselves to the performance of actions stated in the Vedas.

The men who act thus have their places in hell. Frenzy has eighteen defects—as already described here—hatred of men, factiousness¹, censoriousness, untruthful speech, lust, wrath, want of self-control², speaking ill of others, backbiting, mismanagement in business³, quarrelsomeness, animosity, troubling living creatures, want of forgiveness, delusion, flippancy, loss of reason⁴, censoriousness⁵; therefore a wise man should not be subject to frenzy, for it is always censured. Six characteristics should be understood as (belonging) to friendship—that one should rejoice at (anything) agreeable; and feel grieved at (anything) disagreeable; that with a pure heart one, when asked by a deserving (man), should give to him who asks what can⁶ certainly be given, (though it) may be beneficial to oneself, and even though it ought not to be asked, (namely) one's favourites, sons, wealth, and one's own wife; that one should not dwell there where one has bestowed (all one's) wealth, through a desire (to get a return for one's liberality); that one should enjoy

¹ One copy of Saṅkara's commentary says this means 'obstructing other people's acts of piety,' &c.

² One copy of Saṅkara's commentary says this means 'being given up to intoxicating drinks,' &c.; another copy says, 'doing another's bidding without thought.'

³ One copy says this means 'inattention to any work undertaken;' another renders the original by 'destruction of property, i.e. squandering it on dancers,' &c.

⁴ I. e. discrimination between right and wrong.

⁵ This seems to be some error, for 'censoriousness' has occurred before. But neither the texts nor the commentaries give any help to correct the error. Perhaps the latter is to be distinguished as referring to the habit, and the former only to sporadic acts, of censoriousness. These qualities, I presume, constitute frenzy; they are not the 'defects.'

⁶ I. e. where the power to give exists.

(the fruit of one's¹ own) toils (only); and that one should forego one's own profit². Such a man, possessed of wealth, and possessed of merits, is a liberal man of the quality of goodness³; such a one diverts the five elements from the five⁴ (senses). This⁵ pure penance, acquired out of desire⁶ by those who are fallen off from the truth, even though developed, leads upwards⁷; since sacrifices are performed owing to a misapprehension of the truth⁸. (The

¹ Not a friend's.

² For a friend.

³ See Gîtâ, p. 120.

⁴ The commentators take this to mean objects of sense, and they interpret 'elements' before to mean senses.

⁵ 'Viz. the turning away of the senses from their objects,' says one copy of Saṅkara.

⁶ Scil. to enjoy the higher enjoyments of superior worlds.

⁷ I. e. to the higher worlds; it does not lead to emancipation here.

⁸ Cf. *Mundaka*, p. 277. I must own that I do not quite understand this passage, nor its explanation as given in the commentaries. I do not quite see what the penance here mentioned has to do with sacrifice, and yet the commentators seem to take the words 'since sacrifices,' &c., with what precedes them, not with what follows. Taking them, however, with what follows, it is difficult to explain the word 'since.' As far as I can understand the passage I take the sense of it to be as follows: 'The author having said that penance performed out of a particular motive does not lead to final emancipation, he then proceeds to point out that all 'action' or 'sacrifice' is due to an imperfect understanding of the truth (cf. p. 171 supra), being mostly due to some particular motive. Then he goes on to show the different classes of sacrifice, and finally points out that he who is free from desires is superior to one who is actuated by desires. The original for 'misapprehension' is *avabodha*, which commonly means 'apprehension,' but Saṅkara finally makes it mean *moha* or 'delusion.' The original for truth is rendered by Nîlakantha to mean 'fancies.' Nîlakantha says that the sacrifice by the mind is the highest; that by speech, viz. *Brahmayagña*, *Ġapa*, &c., is middling; and that by deed, viz. with clarified butter and other offerings, of the lowest class. 'Perfected by fancies' = one whose fancies are always fulfilled 'through a knowledge,' says Nîlakantha, 'of the Brahma as possessing qualities.'

sacrifices) of some are by the mind, of others by speech, and also by deed. The man void of fancies takes precedence over the man perfected by fancies,—especially among Brâhmanas¹. And hear this further from me. One should teach this great and glorious² (doctrine); (other doctrines) the wise call mere arrangements of words. On this concentration of mind³, all this⁴ depends. Those who know this become immortal. Not by meritorious action only, O king! does man conquer the truth⁵. One may offer offerings, or sacrifice. By that the child(-like man) does not cross beyond death; nor, O king! does he obtain happiness in his last moments⁶. One should practise devotion quietly, and should not be active even in mind⁷; and then one should avoid delight and wrath (resulting) from praise and censure⁸. I say to you, O learned person! that adhering to this⁹, one attains the Brahman and perceives it, O Kshatriya! by a course (of study) of the Vedas.

¹ This also is far from clear. Should it be, 'and a Brâhmana more especially?' This might be taken as referring to one who knows the Brahman as devoid of qualities, as Nîlakantha does take it. But his construction is not quite clear.

² As serviceable in attaining to 'the glory,' the Brahman; see p. 180.

³ See note 1 at p. 181. As to 'arrangements of words,' cf. Maitrî, p. 179.

⁴ 'Everything,' says one copy of Sankara's commentary; 'all that is good and desirable,' says another.

⁵ Cf. inter alia, *Mundaka*, pp. 281-314.

⁶ For he has got to undergo migration from one life to another as the result of the action. Cf. *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 856; *Mundaka*, p. 278.

⁷ Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 70.

⁸ Ibid. pp. 101-110.

⁹ I.e. the yoga or concentration of mind here described. This stanza, like many others in this chapter, occurs in chapter III with slight variations.

CHAPTER VI.

That pure¹, great light², which is radiant; that great glory³; that, verily, which the gods worship⁴; that by means of which the sun shines forth⁵—that eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. From (that) pure (principle) the Brahman⁶ is produced; by (that) pure (principle) the Brahman is developed⁷; that pure (principle), not illumined among all radiant (bodies), is (itself) luminous and illuminates (them)⁸. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. The perfect is raised out of the perfect. It (being raised) out of the perfect is called the perfect. The perfect is withdrawn from the perfect, and the perfect only remains⁹. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees.

¹ Free from ignorance and other taints. See *Katha*, p. 144.

² Saṅkara compares *Katha*, p. 142. See, too, *Mundaka*, p. 303; and note 4 infra.

³ *Svetâsvatara*, p. 347, and p. 180 supra.

⁴ Saṅkara refers to *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 887.

⁵ Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 112, note 1.

⁶ 'Named *Hiranyagarbha*,' Saṅkara. Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 107; *Svetâsvatara*, p. 354; *Mundaka*, p. 309; *Maitrî*, p. 130; *Taitt. Âraṇ.* p. 894.

⁷ 'In the form of *Virâg*,' says Saṅkara. As to these two, cf. *Mundaka*, pp. 270–272; and Saṅkara's and Ânandagiri's notes there. See also *Svetâsvatara*, pp. 324, 325; and *Nṛisimha Tâpinî*, pp. 233, 234; Colebrooke, *Essays*, pp. 344, 368 (Madras reprint). The *Virâg* corresponds rather to the gross material world viewed as a whole; the *Hiranyagarbha* to the subtle elements similarly viewed, an earlier stage in the development. Cf. the *Vedântasâra*.

⁸ Cf. *Mundaka*, p. 303, and *Gîtâ*, p. 112.

⁹ The individual self is part of the supreme (*Gîtâ*, p. 112); perfect = not limited by space, time, &c.; as being part of a thing perfect in its essence, the individual soul also is perfect. The individual self is withdrawn from the perfect, viz. the whole aggregate of body, senses, & presided over by the self, and when so withdrawn it appears to be the pure self only. Cf. *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 948.

(From the Brahman), the waters¹ (are produced); and then from the waters, the gross body. In the space within that², dwelt the two divine (principles). Both enveloping the quarters and sub-quarters, support earth and heaven³. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. The horse⁴ (-like senses) lead towards heaven him, who is possessed of knowledge and divine, (who is) free from old age, and who stands on the wheel of this chariot (-like body), which is transient, but the operations of which are imperishable⁵. That eternal divine being⁶ is perceived by devotees. His form has no parallel⁷; no one sees him with the eye⁸. Those who apprehend him by means of the understanding, and also the mind and heart, become immortal⁹. That eternal

¹ 'The five elements,' says Saṅkara, cf. Aitareya, p. 189; and for 'gross body,' the original is literally 'water;' see supra, p. 179, note 6; and see, too, Īsopanishad, p. 11, and Svetâsvatara, p. 368, for different but kindred meanings.

² Viz. the lotus-like heart. Cf. *Khândogya*, p. 528.

³ The two principles between them pervade the universe, the individual self being connected with the material world, the other with heaven; 'divine' is, literally, 'the brilliant,' says Saṅkara, who quotes *Kaṭha*, p. 305, as a parallel for the whole passage.

⁴ Cf. *Kaṭha*, p. 111; *Maitrî*, pp. 19-34; and *Mahâbhârata Strî Parvan*, chap. VII, st. 13. Heaven = the Brahman here (see *Bṛhadâraṇyaka*, p. 876); divine = not vulgar, or unrefined—Saṅkara, who adds that though the senses generally lead one to sensuous objects, they do not do so when under the guidance of true knowledge.

⁵ The body is perishable, but action done by the self while in the body leaves its effect.

⁶ To whom, namely, the man of knowledge goes, as before stated.

⁷ Cf. *Svetâsvatara*, p. 347.

⁸ Cf. *Kaṭha*, p. 152, and comment there, where the eye is said to stand for all the senses.

⁹ *Kaṭha*, p. 149; *Svetâsvatara*, pp. 346-348, also p. 330 (should it be *manîshâ* there instead of *manviso*?). The meanings of the three words are difficult to fix accurately. Saṅkara varies in his interpre-

divine being is perceived by devotees. The currents of twelve collections¹, supported by the Deity, regulate the honey²; and those who follow after it move about in (this) dangerous (world). That eternal divine being³ is perceived by devotees. The bee⁴ drinks that accumulated honey for half a month⁵. The Lord created the oblation for all beings⁶. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. Those who are devoid of wings⁷, coming

tations. Probably the meaning he gives here is the best. Mind and understanding have been explained at Gîtâ, p. 57. The heart is the place within, where the self is said to be, and it may be taken as indicating the self, the meaning would then be—a direct consciousness in the self of its unity with the Supreme. See, too, Taitt. Âraṇ. p. 896.

¹ The five organs of action, the five senses of perception, the mind and understanding make the twelve.

² Each current has its own honey regularly distributed to it under the supervision of the Deity, the Supreme. Honey=material enjoyment. Cf. Kaṭha, p. 126, where Saṅkara renders it by karmaphala, 'fruit of action.'

³ Who supervises the distribution as stated. Cf. Vedânta-sûtra III, 2, 28-31.

⁴ Bhramara, which the commentators interpret to mean 'one who is given to flying about—the individual self.'

⁵ I. e. in one life in respect of actions done in a previous life.

⁶ Saṅkara says this is in answer to a possible difficulty that action performed here cannot have its fruit in the next world, as the fruit is so far removed in time from the action. The answer is, The Lord, the Supreme, can effect this, and taking his existence into account there is no difficulty. Oblation=food, &c., Saṅkara. The meaning of the whole passage, which is not very clear, seems to be that the Lord has arranged things so that each being receives some of this honey, this food, which is the fruit of his own action. Then the question arises, Do these beings always continue taking the honey and 'migrating,' or are they ever released? That is answered by the following sentence.

⁷ 'The wings of knowledge,' says Saṅkara, citing a Brâhmaṇa text, 'those, verily, who have knowledge are possessed of wings, those who are not possessed of knowledge are devoid of wings.'

to the Asvattha of golden leaves¹, there become possessed of wings, and fly away happily². That eternal divine being³ is perceived by devotees. The upward life-wind swallows up the downward life-wind; the moon swallows up the upward life-wind; the sun swallows up the moon⁴; and another⁵ swallows up the sun. Moving about above the waters, the supreme self⁶ does not raise one leg⁷. (Should he raise) that, which is always performing sacrifices⁸, there will be no death, no immortality⁹. That eternal divine being¹⁰ is perceived by devotees.

¹ So, literally; Saṅkara explains 'golden' to mean 'beneficial and pleasant,' by a somewhat fanciful derivation of the word *hiranya*. He refers to *Gîtâ*, p. 111, about the leaves of the Asvattha. Nīlakanṭha takes the leaves to be son, wife, &c., which are 'golden,' attractive at first sight. 'Coming to the Asvattha,' Saṅkara says, 'means being born as a Brâhmana,' &c. 'Flying away' = obtaining final emancipation.

² The 'selves' are compared to birds in the famous passage at *Mundaka*, p. 306 (also *Svetâsvatara*, p. 337). See also *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 499.

³ Knowledge of whom leads to 'flying away happily.'

⁴ Cf. *Khândogya*, p. 441. Saṅkara says that the author here explains the yoga by which the Supreme is to be attained. As to the life-winds, cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 61. 'The moon,' says Saṅkara, 'means the mind, and the sun the understanding, as they are the respective deities of those organs' (cf. *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, pp. 521-542, and *Aitareya*, p. 187, where, however, the sun is said to appertain to the eye).

⁵ I. e. the Brahman; the result is, one remains in the condition of being identified with the Brahman.

⁶ Literally, flamingo. Cf. *Svetâsvatara*, pp. 332, 367; see also p. 289; *Maitrî*, p. 99; and the commentary on *Svetâsvatara*, p. 283.

⁷ Viz. the individual self, Saṅkara; that is, as it were, the bond of connexion between the Supreme and the world. Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 112.

⁸ This is the meaning, though the word in the original is *Râtvig*, which in the later literature only means priest.

⁹ As the whole of the material world is dissolved, when the self is dissevered from the delusion which is the cause of it.

¹⁰ Viz. who moves about on the waters, as above stated.

The being which is the inner self, and which is of the size of a thumb¹, is always migrating in consequence of the connexion with the subtle body². The deluded ones do not perceive that praiseworthy lord, primeval and radiant, and possessed of creative power³. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. Leading mortals to destruction by their own action⁴, they conceal themselves like serpents in secret recesses⁵. The deluded men then become more deluded⁶. The enjoyments afforded by them cause delusion, and lead to worldly life⁷. That eternal divine being⁸ is perceived by devotees. This⁹ seems to be common to all mankind—whether possessed of resources¹⁰ or not possessed of resources—it is common to immortality and the other¹¹. Those who are possessed (of them)¹² attain there to the source of the honey¹³. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. They go,

¹ Svetâsvatara, pp. 330–355; Taitt. Âran. p. 858, and comments there.

² The life-winds, the ten organs or senses, mind, and understanding. See the same word similarly interpreted at Svetâsvatara, p. 306, and Sâṅkhya-sūtra III, 9.

³ According to Saṅkara, he who makes the distinct entities, after entering into them; he alludes apparently to *Khândogya*, p. 407.

⁴ Namely, that of giving the poison of sensuous objects.

⁵ I. e. the eye, ear, &c., like the holes of serpents.

⁶ I. e. can appreciate nought but those sensuous objects.

⁷ One reading is, 'lead to danger' = which means 'to hell,' according to Nilakantha.

⁸ Scil. delusion about whom leads to 'danger' or 'worldly life.'

⁹ The quality of being one with the Brahman in essence.

¹⁰ Self-restraint, tranquillity, &c.

¹¹ I. e. whether in the midst of worldly life, or in the state of perfect emancipation.

¹² Viz. the resources spoken of before.

¹³ Viz. the supreme Brahman. 'There' Saṅkara takes to mean 'in the supreme abode of Vishnu.' See Introduction.

pervading both worlds by knowledge¹. Then the Agnihotra though not performed is (as good as) performed². Your (knowledge) of the Brahman, therefore, will not lead you to littleness³. Knowledge is (his)⁴ name. To that the talented ones attain. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. The self of this description absorbing the material cause⁵ becomes great. And the self of him who understands that being is not degraded here⁶. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. One should ever and always be doing good. (There is) no death, whence (can there be) immortality⁷? The real and the unreal have both the same real (entity) as their basis. The source of the existent and the non-existent is but one⁸. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. The

¹ Saṅkara does not explain this. Nīlakaṇṭha says pervading = fully understanding; both worlds = the self and the not-self. Is the meaning something like that of the passage last cited by Saṅkara under Vedānta-sūtra IV, 2, 14?

² He obtains the fruit of it, Saṅkara. See as to Agnihotra. *Khândogya*, p. 381 seq.; and Vedānta-sūtra IV, 1, 16.

³ I. e. this mortal world, as action &c. would do.

⁴ I. e. of one who understands himself to be the Brahman. See Aitareya-upanishad, p. 246.

⁵ Saṅkara says, 'the cause in which all is absorbed.' Cf. a similar, but not identical, meaning given to Vaisvānara at *Khândogya*, p. 264; and see Vedānta-sūtra I, 2, 24. Becomes great = becomes the Brahman, Saṅkara.

⁶ Even in this body, Saṅkara; degradation he takes to mean departure from the body, citing *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, p. 540.

⁷ There is no worldly life with birth and death for one who does good, and thinks his self to be the Brahman; hence no emancipation from such life either.

⁸ The Brahman is the real, and on that the unreal material world is imagined. Cf. Taittirīya, p. 97, and Saṅkara's comments there, which are of use in understanding this passage.

being who is the inner self, and who is of the size of a thumb, is not seen, being placed in the heart¹. He is unborn, is moving about day and night, without sloth. Meditating on him, a wise man remains placid². That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. From him comes the wind³; in him, likewise, is (everything) dissolved. From him (come) the fire and the moon; and from him comes life⁴. That is the support (of the universe); that is immortal; that is all things perceptible⁵; that is the Brahman, that glory. From that all entities were produced; and in that (they) are dissolved⁶. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. The brilliant (Brahman) supports the two divine principles⁷ and the universe, earth and heaven, and the quarters. He from whom the rivers flow in (various) directions, from him were created the great oceans⁸. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. Should one fly, even after furnishing oneself with thousands upon thousands of wings, and even though one should have the velocity of thought⁹, one would never reach the end of the (great) cause¹⁰. That eternal divine

¹ Cf. *Kaṭha*, pp. 130, 157; and *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, p. 360.

² Cf. *Svetâsvatara*, p. 342; *Kaṭha*, pp. 100, 107; *Maitrî*, p. 134.

³ Cf. *Taittirîya*, p. 67; *Kaṭha*, p. 146; *Mundaka*, p. 293.

⁴ *Kaṭha*, p. 298; *Mundaka*, p. 288.

⁵ See p. 180, note 7.

⁶ See p. 180 supra.

⁷ 'The individual soul, and God,' say the commentators, the latter being distinct from the supreme self. 'The universe,' says *Nilakantha*, 'means earth,' &c., by which I suppose he means earth, heaven, quarters, mentioned directly afterwards.

⁸ *Kaṭha*, p. 293.

⁹ This figure is implied in the *Îsopanishad*, p. 10.

¹⁰ 'Therefore it is endless,' says *Saṅkara*; and as to this, cf. *Taittirîya*, p. 51.

being is perceived by devotees. His form dwells in the unperceived¹; and those whose understandings are very well refined² perceive him. The talented man who has got rid (of affection and aversion) perceives (him) by the mind. Those who understand him³ become immortal. When one sees this self in all beings stationed in various places⁴, what should one grieve for after that⁵? The Brâhmaṇa has (as much interest) in all beings, as in a big reservoir of water, to which waters flow from all sides⁶. I alone am your mother⁷, father ;

¹ 'In a sphere beyond the reach of perception,' says Saṅkara, who also quotes *Kaṭha*, p. 149, or *Svetâsvatara*, p. 347, where the same line also occurs.

² The original for understandings is *sattva*, which Saṅkara renders to mean *antaḥkarana*. 'Refined,' he says, 'by sacrifices and other sanctifying operations.' In the *Kaṭha* at p. 148 *sattva* is rendered by Saṅkara to mean *buddhi*—a common use of the word.

³ 'As being,' says Saṅkara, 'identical with themselves.' It will be noted that the form of expression is slightly altered here. It is not 'those who understand this.'

⁴ I.e. in different aggregates of body, senses, &c. Cf. *Gîtâ*, pp. 104 and 124; also *Khândogya*, pp. 475-551.

⁵ Cf. *Brîhadâraṇyaka*, p. 882; Saṅkara also refers to *Îsopaniṣad*, p. 14.

⁶ The words are pretty nearly the same as at *Gîtâ*, p. 48. Saṅkara says, the Brâhmaṇa 'who has done all he need do' has no interest whatever in any being, as he has none in a big reservoir, and he cites *Gîtâ*, p. 54, in support of this. One copy of Saṅkara, however, differs from this; that runs thus: 'As a person who has done all he need do, has no interest in a big reservoir of water, so to a Brâhmaṇa who sees the self in all beings, there is no interest in all the actions laid down in the Vedas, &c.; as he has obtained everything by mere perception of the self.' Nîlakantha's reading is exactly the same as at *Gîtâ*, p. 48.

⁷ Saṅkara says that Sanatsugâta states here his own experiences, like Vâmadeva (about whom there is a reference at *Brîhadâraṇyaka*, p. 216) and others, to corroborate what he has already said. Cf. also *Gîtâ*, p. 83, as to the whole passage.

and I too am the son. And I am the self of all this—that which exists and that which does not exist¹. (I am) the aged grandfather of this, the father, and the son, O descendant of Bharata! You dwell in my self only². You are not mine, nor I (yours). The self only is my seat³; the self too is (the source of) my birth⁴. I am woven through and through⁵ (everything). And my seat is free from (the attacks of) old age⁶. I am unborn, moving about day and night, without sloth. Knowing (me), verily, a wise man remains placid⁷. More minute than an atom⁸, possessed of a good mind⁹, I am stationed within all beings¹⁰. (The wise) know the father of all beings to be placed in the lotus¹¹ (-like heart of every one).

¹ See *Gîtâ*, p. 84. *Nilakantha* takes what exists to mean 'present,' and what does not exist to mean 'past and future.' Cf. *Khândogya*, p. 532.

² See *Gîtâ*, p. 82, where there is also a similar apparent contradiction.

³ Cf. *Khândogya*, p. 518.

⁴ That is to say he is 'unborn,' says *Nilakantha*. *Saṅkara* seems to take 'my' with 'seat' only, and not with birth; for he says, 'everything has its birth from the self.'

⁵ Cf. *Mundaka*, p. 298; *Maitrî*, p. 84, and comment there.

⁶ Cf. *Gîtâ*, pp. 77, 109, and *Khândogya*, pp. 535, 550.

⁷ See p. 192, note 2.

⁸ Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 78, and note 3 there.

⁹ I.e. a mind free from affection and aversion, hatred, &c., *Saṅkara*.

¹⁰ Cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 113, and note 3; and also *Îsopanishad*, p. 12.

¹¹ *Khândogya*, p. 528; and cf. *Gîtâ*, p. 113.